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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
 
Distinctiveness and conformity are core interests for researchers of organizations and 
management studies. Distinctiveness allows firms to cultivate new identities and styles and 
to contribute to the evolution of entire industries through innovation. However, conformity 
is recommended as audiences are more likely to accept organizations whose product 
offering follow widely established normative expectations embodied in conventional 
product features while sanctioning nonconforming behaviors that run against the taken for 
grantedness of established prescriptions. Several studies have investigated how 
organizations face the tension between conformity and distinctiveness as a way of gaining 
social and economic benefits (e.g., status advantage, reputation improvement, better 
financial performance and competitive advantage).  
My dissertation focuses on unexplored social, strategic and community-based factors 
enabling organizations to pursue distinctiveness even in contexts where conformity 
pressures are strong. I explore this topic in the innovative empirical setting of Italian opera 
where opera houses’ need to achieve distinctiveness through the artistic renewal of their 
programming strategies clashes with the necessity for them to conform to taken for granted 
expectations for the preservation of a historically established operatic patrimony.  
 This research falls into two broad streams. The first examines how organizations’ social 
positioning (i.e., social standing) affects their ability to violate established normative 
prescriptions through nonconforming behaviors and which strategic actions enable them to 
offset the penalties of nonconformity. The second sheds light on the community-based 
antecedents of opera houses’ non-conforming behaviors and contributes specifically to the 
arts management literature on innovation in performing arts organizations. Within this 
second perspective I conducted an analysis of the opera audiences’ profile as a way of 
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providing opera managers who aspire to renew their artistic program with insight into the 
specific traits that characterize their audience. 
The dissertation is structured as follows. First, using network analysis and panel data 
regression analysis, I explore how organizations’ social positioning (its status) affects their 
willingness to adopt nonconforming behaviors. Second, I theorize and empirically test how 
organizations can act strategically to mitigate the potential penalties that derive from a 
particular form of norm-breaking behaviors which consists in hybridizing the features of a 
taken for granted category of products infused with established normative prescriptions. 
Focusing specifically on the arts management literature, I then theorize about the political 
and economic factors that may drive norm-breaking behaviors in the field of opera. Finally I 
close the dissertation with an analysis of the profile of the Italian opera audience as a way of 
providing opera houses’ managers with an in depth knowledge of their audience-base 
which can be put at the service of the development of innovative programming strategies. 
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From La Bohème to La Wally: 
How Organizational Status Affects the (Un)conventionality of Opera Repertoire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: 
 
Status is defined as “an organization’s position in the social system that can be ranked 
among other positions based on its relative prestige or social esteem” (Collet and Philippe, 
2014; Jensen, Kim and Kim, 2011, p.87; Merton, 1957). Although status has commonly been 
depicted as “an inherently conservative, stabilizing force” (Podolny 2005, p. 255; Sauder, 
Lynn and Podolny, 2012), recent literature highlights the instability that shapes most status 
structures: high status organizations can “fall from grace” (Graffin et al., 2013; Jensen, 2006) 
while organizations lower in status can ascend the status hierarchy (Lounsbury, 2002).  
The mobility of organizations within a status structure can take different forms (Jensen, 
Kim and Kim, 2011). First, organizations can make targeted investments in specific product 
features that respond to the dominant criterion used to rank them in a market space. Second, 
organizations can attempt to improve their social position by attracting flows of individuals 
from their higher status counterparts. Whether status mobility occurs through targeted 
investments or by individuals’ mobility (Jensen, Kim and Kim, 2011), most research focuses 
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on the contextual factors that shape status dynamics in a field (Collet and Philippe, 2014; 
Huang and Washington, 2011; Lifschitz, Sauder and Stevens, 2014; Lounsbury, 2002). 
Against this backdrop, studies have started to examine how conflicting normative 
expectations of status-worthy behaviors affect the mobility of firms within the status 
hierarchy (Lifschitz, Sauder and Stevens, 2014; Lounsbury, 2002). However, the investigation 
of status instability as a specific condition that shapes the willingness of firms to embrace 
deviant status-based expectations is an under-examined area of research. We focus therefore 
on how status instability shapes the systems of incentives for firms in different social 
positions to undertake nonconforming actions that deviate from a dominant status-based 
norm.  
A central argument in theory on status and nonconformity is that high and low status 
organizations are willing to defy established conventions because they are secure of the 
respective social acceptance and rejection of their actions while middle status organizations 
conform more to protect their social standing (Phillips and Zuckerman, 2001). In this regard, 
normative pressures orient middle status organizations to align their offer to mainstream 
contents (Durand and Kremp, 2015) that confer them with status in front of relevant 
audiences. We add that when conflicting audiences’ expectations challenge the dominant 
criterion for status distinction in a field, opportunities to leverage deviant status-based 
expectations to protect and improve their social standing encourage middle status 
organizations to defy prevailing normative prescriptions. By contrast, high and low status 
organizations’ freedom of deviance is constrained. What hampers the ability of high status 
organizations to challenge dominant normative pressures is the threat of status loss that 
stems from the betrayal of dominant audiences’ interests they are committed to serve 
(Phillips, Turco and Zuckerman, 2013). At the same time, low status organizations increase 
their conformity to the expectations of this audience as a way of filling their legitimacy-gap 
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and avoiding the penalties associated with the risk of social rejection (Deephouse and Carter, 
2005; Dittes and Kelley, 1956). 
Recent studies on the social antecedents of conformity and deviance have shown that 
organizations can both preserve and diverge from a dominant norm concurrently, and that 
conformity to a norm can be a way to achieve distinctiveness (Durand and Kremp, 2015; 
Durand, Rao and Monin, 2007; Jensen and Kim, 2013). Building on these studies, we argue 
that aesthetic conventionality – the adoption of visual features (Bloch, Brunel and Arnold, 
2003; Castaner and Campos, 2002) that reflect taken for granted forms of presenting an 
organization’s product offering – differentially alters high, middle and low status 
organizations’ willingness to diverge from a dominant norm. By masking the controversial 
aspects of contents that are unacceptable by dominant audiences, an increased aesthetic 
conventionality confers high and low status organizations a discretional power of deviance 
by protecting their social standing against status loss. Conversely, by de-emphasizing the 
counter-normative aspects of deviant undertakings among divergent audiences, aesthetic 
conventionality creates barriers to upward status mobility efforts built around divergent 
expectations which in turn reduces the incentives for middle status firms to depart from 
dominant normative prescriptions. 
Our study advances research on status and nonconformity (Durand and Kremp, 2015; 
Durand, Rao and Monin, 2007; Jensen, 2006; Jensen, Kim and Kim, 2011; Phillips and 
Zuckerman, 2001) in several ways. First, we shed light on how possibilities for upward and 
downward status mobility that stem from the enactment of divergent status based 
prescriptions create incentives and constraints for firms in different social positions to 
undertake norm-breaking actions. Second, we identify the degree of conventionality in the 
forms or design of presenting their offering (aesthetic conventionality) as a mechanism that 
affects high, mid and low status organizations’ freedom to infuse the contents of their 
6  
product offering with deviant status-based prescriptions. High and low status organizations 
can leverage aesthetic conventionality to achieve greater distinctiveness in the contents of 
their offerings while middle status organizations are forced to increase their conformity to 
mainstream contents when they emphasize the conventional visual appearance of their 
offering.  
I test our hypotheses on how status affects nonconformity within unstable status 
hierarchies with data on the Italian opera market from 2004 to 2011. We begin by providing 
a review of the literature on the relationship between status and nonconformity, before 
theorizing why opportunities for status mobility triggered by the tension between 
competing status-based norms alter the relationship between status and the degree of 
unconventionality of opera house repertoires. We hypothesize next that the success or 
failure of status in fostering unconventional programming decisions is contingent upon the 
level of opera houses’ commitment to an authorized way of visually presenting their 
repertoire to different audiences, which in turn reshapes the incentives for opera houses in 
different status positions to program unconventional operas. We end our study by 
discussing the implications of our findings for research and practice, examining limitations, 
and making suggestions for future research. 
 
 
STATUS AND NONCONFORMITY WITHIN UNSTABLE STATUS HIERARCHIES 
 
The status of an organization refers to “its position in the social hierarchy that results 
from accumulated acts of deference and respects” (Collet and Philippe, 2014; Goode, 1978; 
Sauder, Lynn and Podolny, 2012, p. 268; Whyte, 1943). Status has a signaling value: it acts as 
a lens through which external parties interpret the quality of the products produced by an 
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organization. In this regard, status functions as an uncertainty-reducing signal that enhances 
the positive perception of the products that the organization produces. Indeed, the products 
of high status organizations are perceived to be of higher quality than those of organizations 
in lower vertical positions. The uncertainty-reducing value of status is particularly important 
when it is difficult for the external audience to evaluate the quality of the products of an 
organization before purchase (Podolny, 1994). This is the case of cultural products whose 
appreciation cannot be determined a priori and requires the audience to be immersed in the 
consumption experience (De Vany, 2004; Hirsch, 1972).  
Status research often emphasizes the reproduction of current status arrangements and the 
relative stability of status hierarchies over time, with more organizations staying in the same 
position rather than moving from one position to another. However, recent studies have 
shown that most status structures are unstable, as firms within those hierarchies may strive 
to undertake status-enhancing actions aimed at acquiring a higher social position 
(Lounsbury, 2002; Graffin et al., 2013; Rao, Monin and Durand, 2005). Status mobility can 
take two different forms. First, organizations can undertake targeted investments in specific 
product features that respond to the dominant criterion to rank them in a market space in an 
attempt to move to a higher vertical position (Jensen, Kim and Kim, 2011). For example, if 
the dominant criterion for a coffee shop chain to be ranked as a high status one is to deliver 
high quality in-shop consumer experiences, organizations in the coffee shop market may 
decide to invest more resources in the quality of their consumer experiences in an attempt to 
enter a higher vertical status bracket.  
Second, regardless of the direct investments to improve their rankings, organizations may 
also attempt to move to a higher vertical position by affiliating with organizations in the 
desired vertical position (Jensen, Kim and Kim, 2011). This perspective acknowledges the 
relational component of status, constructed as a set of exchange relationships among actors 
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in a field (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; Collet and Philippe, 2014; Podolny, 2001; Podolny 
and Phillips, 1996). Firms have strong incentives to establish relationships with firms in 
higher status positions in order to benefit from status-enhancing effects while increasing the 
perception of their quality in a market. Gulati and Higgins (2003) argue that by affiliating 
with highly esteemed organizations, a focal organization can accumulate status over time. 
Status flows through the ties that link market actors within a social structure and the 
mobility of individuals between firms is a typical conduit that enables the transfer of status. 
For example, by attracting a major figure from a high status competitor, a firm can improve 
its social standing. Similarly, the flow of academics between institutions often facilitates the 
transfer of status among academic departments; recruiting a prominent member from a 
prestigious department is a typical strategy for enhancing a department’s status (Podolny, 
1993).  
Despite the widespread interest in the factors that trigger status mobility (Lifschitz, 
Sauder and Stevens 2014; Lounsbury, 2002; Rao, Monin and Durand, 2005; Sauder, 2006), the 
examination of how firms behave within unstable status hierarchies remains largely 
unexplored. We shift attention accordingly from the factors that trigger instability to the 
examination of the disposition of firms within unstable status structures to undertake norm-
breaking behaviors that violate the dominant norm that solidifies the status hierarchy. We 
concentrate on a specific type of status mobility that occurs when conflicting audiences’ 
expectations of status-worthy behaviors can be leveraged by firms to attract individuals 
from organizations in higher status positions in order to move up in the status hierarchy.  
However, as firms within different status brackets are differentially dependent on 
dominant audiences’ prescriptions to safeguard their status positions, their dispositions to 
embrace divergent audiences’ interests may vary. A core claim in theory on status and 
nonconformity is that middle status organizations follow prevailing normative expectations 
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for fear of compromising their social standing (Deephouse and Carter, 2005; Phillips and 
Zuckerman, 2001; Sauder, Lynn and Podolny, 2012). The extent to which middle status 
organizations’ freedom of deviance is constrained, however, depends on the levels of risk 
they face by breaking with dominant conventions, as well as on how nonconformity 
hampers possibilities for them to ascend the status hierarchy (Cancian, 1967; Phillips and 
Zuckerman, 2001).  
Middle status organizations have the flexibility to embrace norm-deviant behaviors 
infused with the interests of divergent audience segments. This is because, contrary to high 
status firms that are more committed to serving the interests of dominant audience segments 
(Phillips, Turco and Zuckerman, 2013), middle status firms are more protected from the 
external sanctions of dominant audiences, which in turn reduces the risk of status loss that 
stems from deviant behaviors. Moreover, opportunities for upward mobility are strong 
incentives for middle status organizations to pursue nonconformity. Norm-breaking 
behaviors may in fact enable them to attract individuals from firms in high status positions 
by providing these individuals with opportunities to be acclaimed among a divergent 
audience without making them incur the criticism of dominant audiences. Indeed, studies 
have shown that individuals are not always following-the rules actors and have interests in 
nurturing the divergent traits of their market popularity through an intentional violation of 
dominant norms (Rindova, Pollock and Hayward, 2006), while gaining acclaim among a 
divergent audience (Jensen, 2010).  
Conversely, high and low status organizations’ freedom to violate dominant status-based 
expectations is obstructed by the threat of downward status mobility. As embracing a 
conflicting norm implies a betrayal of the interests of audience segments they are committed 
to serve, high status organizations risk their high status advantage when they violate 
dominant normative prescriptions (Phillips, Turco and Zuckerman, 2013; Sauder, Lynn and 
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Podolny, 2012). Criticism by core audience segments threatens the security in their social 
position because it damages their reputation for quality. At the same time, the very low 
social acceptability of organizations at the bottom of the status hierarchy (Kim, Jensen and 
Kim, 2011) and their low access to survival-enhancing opportunities (Deephouse and Carter, 
2005; Sauder, Lynn and Podolny, 2012) makes them particularly sensitive to the risk of social 
rejection. Rejection-based status anxiety limits their freedom of deviance (Dittes and Kelley, 
1956). 
The extent to which high and low status openness to norm-breaking behaviors is 
constrained ultimately depends on their exposure to the social penalties that stem from 
nonconformity (Durand and Kremp, 2015). We argue that high and low status firms’ efforts 
to raise the recognizability and identifiability of the visual aspects of their offering enables 
them to protect their social position against the sanctions stemming from nonconformity. 
Whereas nonconformity signals an organization’s effort to evidence its offer with respect to 
mainstream contents that are widely accepted by relevant audiences (Durand and Kremp, 
2015), aesthetic conventionality enables firms to mask illegitimate, deviant contents (Elsbach 
and Sutton, 1992; Scott, 1987) under a legitimate visual appearance. This in turn fosters high 
and low status firms’ ability to create a taken for granted interpretation of deviant behaviors 
in the eyes of dominant audiences. On the one hand, aesthetic conventionality provides low 
status organizations with an increased social acceptability in the eyes of dominant audience 
segments, which mitigates their anxiety of being exposed to the economic penalties that 
stems from the exclusion from the social system. At the same time, it provides high status 
organizations with an increased security in their social positions that alleviates the risk of 
status leakage that can arise as a consequence of nonconformity.  
On the other hand, by de-emphasizing the counter-normative aspects of norm-breaking 
behaviors, aesthetic conventionality results in a reduced potential for middle status 
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organizations to raise the success of their nonconforming actions among divergent audiences 
which is what drives the willingness of individuals within higher status brackets to affiliate 
with them (Jensen, 2010). This in turn constrains middle status organizations’ openness to 
nonconformity by hampering their ability to protect and improve their social standing 
through norm-breaking behaviors.  
Shifting focus from general arguments on status and nonconformity to status and 
nonconformity in the opera field we will now discuss why, under conditions of status 
instability, opera houses in distinct status positions have different incentives and degrees of 
leeway to violate dominant normative prescriptions.  
 
 
 
STATUS AND NONCONFORMITY IN THE ITALIAN OPERA FIELD 
Conflicting expectations and the instability of the Italian opera houses’ status hierarchy 
 
The status of Italian opera houses depends on their centrality in the social system arising 
from their artists-exchange relationships and is transferred through the mobility of artists 
(Cori, 2004). Drawing a prominent artist from an opera house in a higher status position is a 
way for a focal theatre to acquire status through affiliations with peers in higher status 
positions. At the same time, the dissolution of an opera house’s artists-sharing relationships 
with other peers in the same status bracket engenders status loss.  
The dominant criterion for opera houses’ status distinction is the conservation of a 
mainstream repertoire that reflects the taste of a wide audience and builds the backbone of 
the Italian operatic heritage. However, as tax-exempt, government-funded organizations, 
Italian opera houses have an obligation to society to design their programs not only on the 
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basis of the audience’s actual tastes (i.e., the box office), but also on the basis of what experts 
regard as ‘good’ or ‘necessary’ for cultivating audience tastes, for future generations of 
spectators and for the development of the opera field itself. In this scenario, opera houses 
face the dueling, competing pressures to conform and to deviate from the preservation of an 
historically established, conventional operatic patrimony. By programming underperformed 
operas by Alfredo Catalani (e.g., La Wally), an opera house is less conventional in its 
programming decisions compared to one whose season revolves around well-known 
Giacomo Puccini masterpieces (e.g., La Bohème). 
At the origin of status instability in this field lies the tension between conflicting status-
based expectations, which gives rise to contrasting motives for artists to participate in artistic 
performances with different degrees of conventionality. Being part of the profession, artists 
support the artistic renewal of the standard repertoire, thereby reflecting their need to 
challenge audiences by questioning and transcending existing aesthetic beliefs (Kim and 
Jensen, 2011). In this scenario, opera houses in lower status positions can leverage divergent 
claims for artistic renewal to move up in the status hierarchy. As well-expressed by the 
managing directors of the Teatro del Giglio in Lucca, the Teatro Comunale in Livorno and 
the Teatro di Pisa “over years we have developed a cycle of highly unconventional opera 
titles including underperformed contemporary works (e.g., Il Cappello di Paglia di Firenze, 
Napoli Millionaria by Rota) and forgotten masterpieces of the past (e.g., La Rondine by 
Puccini). While these projects have been supported by experts and public bodies, they also 
attracted high quality directors and conductors who nurtured our prestige and social 
standing” (Tarabella, Paloscia and Proietti, 2013).  
At the same time, though, as in other arts and entertainment domains, the participation in 
unpopular artistic productions can lead artists to stigmatize themselves. This is particularly 
costly, especially for those artists performing at the top of the social system (Jensen, 2010). In 
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this scenario, deviant theatres can lose their status either because of their inability to attract 
artists from other houses in the same or higher status brackets or because of the 
unwillingness of other houses to hire artists who have stigmatized themselves through their 
participation in unpopular productions. The risk of status loss is a major issue for theatres 
striving for artistic renewal: the Teatro Comunale in Bologna lost status, falling from the top 
to the lowest rank of the status hierarchy during the 2008-2009 artistic season, after having 
significantly decreased the average conventionality of its repertoire by almost 50 percent. By 
programming less performed titles from the Italian and the French operatic traditions, such 
as Pinotta by Mascagni or Sansone et Dalila by Camille Saint-Saens, the low status Teatro 
Comunale di Lecce has lowered its social standing from the 2007-2008 artistic season to the 
2008-2009 artistic season, to the point of facing the risk of exiting the social system.  
Field level evidence, therefore, highlights possibilities of upward and downward status 
mobility that arises as the result of theatres’ efforts to challenge dominant tastes through the 
artistic renewal of the repertoire. Theaters within distinct status brackets are unequally 
exposed to the risk of status loss and to the opportunities for status advancement that stems 
from the renewal of their repertoire. This engenders significant variations in their 
disposition to satisfy divergent audiences’ preferences by increasing the unconventionality 
of their repertoires.   
 Middle status opera houses’ intermediate social position enables them to betray the 
expectations of conservative audience segments without incurring in the risk of being 
sanctioned for infringing dominant normative prescriptions. As this safeguards the 
reputation of artists performing on their stages against the negative judgment of a wide 
audience, middle status opera houses that renew their repertoires benefit from an increased 
protection against the risk of failing to draw artists from theatres in the same status bracket, 
which in turn cements their social standing. 
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Middle status opera houses are not only protected against the risk of losing status as a 
consequence of nonconformity, they also benefit from the upward mobility incentives that 
stem from it. Their intermediate, boundary-straddling position between the core and the 
margin of the social system enables them to enhance the creative performance of their 
unconventional repertoires among the divergent segments of critics and experts. Cattani and 
Ferriani (2008) argue that intermediate rather than central or peripheral social positions are 
particularly beneficial for raising the creative performance of innovative artistic projects. 
Thus, mid-status opera houses can offer artists performing at the top of the status hierarchy 
increased opportunities for achieving artistic success among experts through their 
participation in unconventional operas without subjecting them to the criticism of dominant 
audience segments. This in turn increases mid-status theatres’ ability to attract their 
attention and move up in the status hierarchy. In sum, opportunities for upward status 
mobility and barriers to downward mobility offered by the programming of unconventional 
operas are strong incentives for middle status opera houses to renew their repertoires.  
Unlike middle status opera houses, high and low status theatres are in a less 
advantageous position to program unconventional operas. As high status opera houses are 
highly exposed to the external sanctions by conservative audiences, programming 
unconventional operas confronts them with possibilities of status loss because artists from 
other high status houses may avoid compromising their reputation for quality by 
participating in artistic projects carried out by theatres that have been devalued by 
conservative audience segments. As suggested by Alexander Pereira, the new general 
manager of the La Scala theatre “it is a hard task for artists to perform unconventional 
productions at La Scala because of the famous booing of La Scala’s loggionisti and season 
ticket holders (those in the upstairs balconies)……most of these artists they are intimidated 
if not frightened to death” (Pereira, 2014). Since the consequences of a loss of reputation is 
15  
particularly high for artists performing at the top of the social system (Jensen, 2010), they are 
likely to disassociate themselves from high status theatres whose programming decisions 
elicit negative external reactions.  
Jensen (2006) noted that organizations at the top of the social system suffer from status 
anxiety – concerns about being devalued because important external actors question the 
quality of a firm’s partner – which in turn may lead them to break their relationship with 
deviant firms.  Status anxiety increases the reluctance of high status theatres to draw artists 
from deviant peers in the same status bracket. Indeed, high status houses are afraid that 
their social standing can be compromised by the employment of artists who carry with them 
the stigma of theatres criticized by the audience they are committed to serve. Thus, the need 
for high status opera houses to protect their social position against the dissolution of their 
artists-sharing relationships and the consequential threat of status loss leads them to 
conform more to an established operatic repertoire that satisfies the taste of a wide audience. 
The reasons lie in their attempt to stabilize their network of artists-exchange relationships 
with peers in the same status brackets, thus securing their position at the top of the status 
hierarchy.  
Research on middle status conformity suggests that low status organizations have little to 
lose from violating prevailing norms (Phillips and Zuckerman, 2001). However, avoidance 
of the penalties associated with social rejection is a strong constraint for low status 
organizations to undertake norm-breaking actions (Dittes and Kelley, 1956). Being at the 
bottom of the social system, low status opera houses have limited access to economic 
resources that may enhance their chances of long-term survival (Sauder, Lynn and Podolny, 
2012). This makes them strive to gain recognition among a dominant audience and refuse to 
draw artists from other low status theatres that have disregarded the tastes of a dominant 
audience to whom they are economically dependent. As a result, embracing conflicting 
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audiences’ interests can expose low status opera houses to the dissolution of their system of 
relationships that confronts them with the risk of social exclusion. Exclusion from the social 
system is particularly detrimental to the economic sustainability of low status opera houses 
because it may further reduce their prospect of success among dominant audiences.  
Thus, rejection-based status anxiety will push low status opera houses to redouble their 
effort to conform to conventional operas. Complying with the norm that shapes the position 
of high status organizations is a way for low status theatres to claim indirect affiliations with 
their higher status counterparts (Phillips and Zuckerman, 2001), enhancing their legitimacy 
(Deephouse and Carter, 2005) in an attempt to protect and eventually improve their position 
while avoiding the economic penalties that stem from exiting the social system.  
In sum, unlike mid status theatres, high and low status theatres have a lower disposition 
to program unconventional operas because of the respective risk of status loss and social 
exclusion engendered by the inclusion of these operas in their repertoires. 
 
Hypothesis 1.  The relationship between opera houses’ status and the unconventionality of their 
repertoires is inversed U-shaped. 
 
 
We further contend that the disposition of theatres in different status positions to raise 
their repertoire unconventionality also depends on how their repertoires are presented to 
the audience. Indeed, by making decisions about the stage designs of their repertoires, 
theatres have the power to emphasize the legitimate vs. controversial aspects of their 
programs, which in turn determines how operas with different levels of unconventionality 
will be interpreted by both conservative and innovation-oriented audience segments. 
Theatres’ efforts to enhance the authorized, taken-for-granted way of staging their repertoire 
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give birth to productions that respect the visual codes of the time where the opera was set 
(aesthetic conventionality). By contrast, theatres violate conservative ways of presenting 
their operas when their productions reinterpret the meaning of an opera by transferring the 
plot to a different time (aesthetic unconventionality). Giving a contemporary twist to the 19th 
century opera La Traviata, by setting the opera in the present and making the protagonists 
feel contemporary is an example of aesthetic unconventionality. This gives rise to staging 
experiences that change the identifiable, recognizable features of an opera, making even 
highly conventional operas less familiar to the audience by decreasing their comparability 
with other performances of the same music piece.  
Enhancing the conservative traits of their repertoires’ stage designs restricts middle status 
opera houses’ incentives to program unconventional titles because it hampers opportunities 
for middle status theatres to consolidate their social position by undertaking norm-deviant 
behaviors. By hiding the controversial aspects of unconventional repertoires behind a 
legitimate mask, conservative stage designs make the operas in the repertoire less appealing 
and more subject to the critics of opera experts. This divergent audience segment is not only 
seduced by theatres’ search for novelty and artistic originality (Jensen and Kim, 2013; Kim 
and Jensen, 2011; Turrini, O’Hare and Borgonovi, 2008), but it is also willing to attack 
theatres’ reluctance to simultaneously renew the content (e.g., unconventionality of the 
programmed titles) and the form of presenting their repertoire as well (Castaner and 
Campos, 2002).  
Offering conventional staging of unknown repertoire or, vice versa, unconventional 
staging of very popular operas (e.g., La Traviata) is condemned by critics and experts as a 
trivial effort of theatres’ managers to raise the popularity instead of the innovative traits of 
their programs. Indeed, critics strongly encourage cultural institutions to safeguard their 
offering against commercial or mainstream interests (Glynn and Lounsbury, 2005). The 
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renowned opera critic Elvio Giudici suggests that “opera houses are anchoring 
unconventional repertoires to conservative staging experiences, treating their repertoires as 
dead forms of artistic expression instead of emphasizing what makes them contemporary” 
(Giudici, 2012). Thus, by compromising the artistic success of their repertoire, conservative 
staging experiences obstruct the middle status opera houses’ ability to draw artists from 
their high status peers by leveraging the unconventionality of their repertoire. This in turn 
reduces the incentives for opera houses to pursue nonconformity by constraining 
opportunities for upward mobility.  
Adopting conservative staging procedures may not only hamper middle status theatres’ 
opportunities to raise the status hierarchy through repertoire unconventionality, but it may 
also lead to the dissolution of middle status theatres’ network of relationships. Indeed, other 
mid status theatres may be unwilling to draw artists from middle status opera houses that 
have been devalued by experts as this can give rise to forms of social contagion that may 
reverberate throughout these theatres’ network or relationships, negatively affecting their 
own social standing. Thus, decreased incentives to upward mobility and increased need of 
protection against the risk of status loss lead middle status opera houses to being more 
conventional in the selection of the titles in the repertoires when they enhance the 
conservatism of their stage designs.  
Durand and Kremp (2015) noted that “organizations conform selectively by overplaying 
certain features while also introducing novelty” (Durand and Kremp, 2015, p.2; Kim and 
Jensen, 2011; Uzzi and Spiro, 2005). The reason is the need for firms to increase their 
immunity from the penalties that stem from norm-breaking behaviors by providing a basis 
of legitimacy and social acceptability to counter-normative actions (Durand, Rao and Monin, 
2007). In this regard, we argue that aesthetic conventionality has an enabling role for 
repertoire unconventionality for high and low status opera houses because it provides them 
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with protection against the risk of status loss that stems from nonconformity. The reason is 
that operas in the repertoire will be increasingly brought to dominant audience segments 
following a clearly recognizable and understandable visual dimension in line with their plot, 
which in turn enhances the comparability and familiarity of opera houses’ offering in the 
eyes of this audience. Indeed, when an organization’s offering exhibits familiar features is 
more likely to be accepted by broad audiences (Hsu, Hannan, and Koçak, 2009).  
Raising the taken for grantedness of the visual components of their operas makes opera 
houses’ repertoires be perceived as less detached from the expectations of dominant 
audiences because their artistic programs will lie within the boundaries of legitimate, 
conservative staging dimensions. In this scenario, high and low status opera houses will be 
able to enhance their repertoire unconventionality as they benefit from an increased barriers 
against the critics of risk averse audience segments. 
As the lowest ranked opera houses strive to gain recognition in front of a dominant 
audience, the enhanced legitimacy provided by conservative stage designs lowers the 
reluctance of low status theatres to share artists with deviant low status counterparts. Thus, 
aesthetic conventionality defends low status theatres from the risk of social exclusion that 
stems from norm-breaking behaviors which in turn increases their freedom of deviance. A 
reinforced commitment to conservative staging provides high status opera houses with 
enhanced opportunities to protect their reputation for quality as it decreases the negative 
reactions of dominant audience segments against unconventional repertoire decisions. As a 
result, high status opera houses that are more committed to taken-for-granted, authorized 
ways of presenting operas benefit from a greater security, which justifies unconventional 
actions undertaken by organizations at the top of the social system and drives their 
willingness to deviate (Phillips and Zuckerman, 2001).  
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In sum, the degree of leeway for theatres in different status positions to program 
unconventional operas depends on their ability to mask vs. unveil the controversial traits of 
their repertoire through their stage designs. We predict that at the highest and lowest levels 
of status, enhancing the legitimacy and social acceptability of the staging procedures 
mitigates the social barrier toward nonconformity. By contrast, the combination of middle 
status positions with increasingly legitimate way of staging is likely to have the lowest 
impact on opera houses’ openness to nonconformity.  
 
Hypothesis 2. An increased commitment to an authorized, conservative way of staging operas 
(aesthetic conventionality) will moderate the curvilinear relationship between opera houses’ status 
and nonconformity in such a way that high and low, but not moderate, levels of status will positively 
relate to nonconformity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
METHODS 
Data and sample 
The empirical setting of our research is the Italian opera market from 2004 to 2011. Italy is 
the birthplace of opera and opera is part of the cultural heritage of the country. Not 
surprisingly, Italian opera houses’ programming strategies mainly revolve around the 
preservation of historically established Italian operas. Table I shows the most frequently 
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represented operas in Italy from 2004 to 2011: the masterpieces of Puccini and Verdi, the 
most important composers of the Italian opera tradition, are at the top of the ranking. As 
well-expressed by Martorella (1977, p.358) and Jensen and Kim (2013), La Bohème and 
Madama Butterfly continue to be the “Opera ABC” for commercial success, as their inclusion 
in the repertoire satisfies the taste of a wide audience for “opera warhorses”. 
Nowadays Italian opera houses are a fragmented sector, characterized by an offer shared 
between different non-profit institutions (Sicca and Zan, 2005). Our sample is composed by 
the most important professional Italian opera houses (i.e., Lyric and Symphonic foundations, 
Teatri di Tradizione) and operatic festivals. The Lyric and Symphonic Foundations (LSF) are 
private foundations located in the largest Italian towns. By contrast, Teatri di Tradizione 
(TDTs) are usually smaller than LSFs in size, and mainly located in medium size cities. 
Given the relevance of festivals for the Italian operatic tradition and for the artistic 
development of the field, we decided to include them in our sample. Operatic festivals are 
realized in a limited timeframe and located in distinct geographic area. Both  LSFs, TDTs 
and festivals receive significant funding from public bodies at both national and local levels. 
We excluded from our sample ‘lirica ordinaria’, small-scale theatres with short seasons that 
sporadically include operas in their repertoires. Moreover, we did not consider Accademia S. 
Cecilia in Rome, a lyric and symphonic foundation whose repertoire is not focused on 
staged operas but on concert opera and symphonic productions.  
 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table I around here 
------------------------------------ 
 
Information about opera houses’ funding sources, casts and programming decisions was 
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collected manually from specialist yearly magazines (Annuari EDT/CIDIM dell’Opera Lirica in 
Italia), widely regarded as industry references. Each issue provides artistic and economic 
information about the operas performed by Italian opera houses. Each opera is documented 
by means of various qualitative and quantitative data such as titles, composers, number of 
reruns and cast.  
We constructed a panel data set containing information on opera institutions from the 
2004-2005 artistic season to the 2010-2011 artistic season. As most of the time Italian opera 
houses’ artistic seasons do not coincide with the solar year, we have decided to adopt the 
artistic season as the reference time frame. This allows us to maintain the integrity of all the 
seasons in the database.  
Using seasonally updated data from 2004 to 2011, our final sample includes 42 
professional opera companies and festivals, which, given our lagged repertoires (discussed 
in the next section), results in 200 observations. 1 
 
 
 
Measures 
 
Dependent variables 
Unconventionality (nonconformity) of opera repertoires. We measured this variable as the 
inverse of the conformity index (Di Maggio and Stenberg, 1985; Jensen and Kim, 2013; Kim 
and Jensen, 2011; Pierce, 2000), which is calculated as the average number of times the opera 
titles programmed by a given theatre are also programmed by the other theatres in the 
sample. Repertoire unconventionality captures the extent to which an opera house programs 
                                                        
1 Nine observations have been dropped due to missing financial data. 
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unpopular, unfamiliar operas in attempt to meet the goal of artistic originality. The higher 
the index, the higher the innovativeness of a theatre’s repertoire. The lower the index, the 
higher the theatre’s propensity to program the “opera ABC” for financial success (Jensen 
and Kim, 2013; Martorella, 1977, p.358). As operatic seasons are programmed two or three 
years in advance, to measure the conventionality of the operas programmed by a theatre 
over a given artistic season we first counted the number of times each opera in that season 
was produced by all the opera companies in our population over the last two artistic seasons 
(prior to the current one). We then calculated the average conventionality of these operas. 
The first season in our statistical analysis is 2006-2007 (conventionality based on the 2004–
2005 and 2005-2007 artistic seasons) and the last one is 2010-2011 (conventionality based on 
the 2008-2009 and 2009–2010 artistic seasons).  
 
Independent variable 
Relational measure of status. Theatres’ status hierarchy derives from patterns of artists 
exchange relationships. We identify an opera house’s network from the opera house’s 
sharing of artists (e.g. conductors and directors) with other opera houses. That is, a tie 
between opera house i and opera house j exists when opera house i shares artists with opera 
house j. To assess the status of opera house i we constructed a relational matrix R where 
each cell Rij denotes the number of times that the artists hired by the opera house i are also 
hired by the opera house j. R is a symmetric n x n matrix where n denotes the number of 
times that the artists employed by the opera house i perform at opera house j.  Having 
constructed the matrix, we then calculated status scores based on Bonacich’s (1987) centrality 
measure, a standard measure for relational data on status, to determine each organization’s 
status relative to that of other organizations. The measure is defined as follows:  
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where,  is an arbitrary scaling coefficient, B is a weighting parameter, 1 is a column 
vector where each element has the value “1,” and St is also a column vector where element 
Si,t indicates the status of opera house i. Status scores are standardized so that the highest 
status opera house in a given year has a status of 1. The upper bound on B is the reciprocal 
of the largest eigenvalue of the R matrix. For the analyses that follow, we set B at this upper 
bound. Given this specification, an opera house’s status is a function of the number of opera 
houses that hire the same artists and of the status of these opera houses (which in turn 
derives from the number and the status of opera houses with whom they share artists and so 
on). 
Since an opera house’s artistic season in the time period t is programmed over the 
previous two artistic seasons, we believed it was more appropriate to include  the status of 
an opera house as a lagged variable t-2 . This allows us to measure the status of an opera 
house at the time in which the programming decisions for a given artistic season were 
actually made. 
Table II shows the average relational status of Italian opera houses and the percentage of 
mainstream operas in their repertoires from 2004 to 2011. On average, mainstream operas 
account for the 44 percent of the repertoire programmed by the 14 highest ranked opera 
houses. The proportion of mainstream operas in the repertoire is lower for operas houses at 
intermediate levels of status (41 percent) and higher for opera houses at the bottom of the 
status hierarchy (50 percent). 
Aesthetic conventionality refers to the conventionality of the stage design and visual 
representation of the music that constitutes an opera (Heilbrun and Gray, 1993; Jensen and  
Kim, 2013). An opera house adopts a conventional stage design when it respects the time 
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and place where an opera was originally set by the author of its plot (librettista). By contrast 
an opera house adopts an unconventional stage design when it alters an authorized staging 
procedure by transferring the plots and the characters of an opera to a different time and 
place. Aesthetic conventionality is a proxy of a theatre’s willingness to reinforce the 
legitimate and taken-for-granted traits of their identity. To measure aesthetic conventionality 
we divided the percentage of conventional staging adopted by a focal opera house by the 
average percentage of conventional staging adopted seasonally by the other houses in the 
sample (Giudici, 2012; Heilbrun and Gray, 1993). 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table II around here 
------------------------------------ 
 
Control variables 
We used a number of variables to control for alternative explanations for the 
unconventionality of an opera repertoire. All the control variables were updated seasonally.  
Structural holes. We rely on Burt’s measure of structural holes (2004) to account for the 
effect of brokerage on opera houses’ willingness to stage unconventional operas. As a matter 
of fact, organizations occupying the position of brokers are more open to pursue 
innovativeness due to their ability to collaborate with previously unconnected alters and to 
recombine knowledge coming from different actors in the network (Burt, 2004). This 
measure is defined as follows: 
 
 
  
26  
 
where  𝑝𝑖𝑖′  denotes the proportion of i’s network that is invested in the relation with 𝑖
′ , 𝑝𝑞𝑖′ 
indicates the proportion of q’s network that is invested in its relation with 𝑖′. Hi ranges from 
0 to 1. As i is connected to an infinite number of others who are themselves disconnected, Hi 
approaches 0. If i shares artists with few opera houses that are well connected to each other 
(e.g. they constitute a clique and share the same artists),  then Hi will approach 1.  
Opera houses’ funding sources. Opera houses’ funding sources may also influence 
nonconformity in different ways. As audience numbers diminish dramatically for 
unconventional operas (Martorella, 1977; Di Maggio and Stenberg, 1985), performing arts 
organizations that enjoyed high box office revenues and private funding in the past may 
have fewer incentives to favor unconventional repertoires. Conversely, as studies have 
shown that government intervention has a substantial influence in boosting artistic renewal 
in performing arts organizations (Alexander, 1996; Krebs and Pommerehne, 1995; Pierce, 
2000) we might expect government funding to positively influence opera houses’ willingness 
to develop unconventional repertoires.  
We controlled for opera houses’ funding sources by computing the share of total revenues 
accounted for by national and local government grants, private funds and box office 
revenues.  
Time dummies. We also included dummies for each artistic season in the model.  
Artistic merit. Following Delmestri, Montanari and Usai (2005) we consider the awards 
received from leading national critics as a measure of theatres’ artistic merit. As critics 
constantly seek to review unconventional performances (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988), an 
increased appreciation by critics might support theatres’ nonconformist artistic 
undertakings. We included the number of awards a theatre received over the two previous 
artistic seasons as a proxy of the theatre’s artistic merit. Data on awards come from the well-
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established National Association of Italian Music Critics. This association awards the Franco 
Abbiati Prize to the worthiest productions staged by Italian opera houses on a yearly basis.  
New productions. Theatres that put new productions on stage are typically less risk averse 
and may be more open to program unconventional operas. A new production includes new 
cast, set designs, costumes, and stage directions that had not been previously used by the 
opera house. For example, in 2006 Teatro alla Scala in Milan set up a production of the 
famous opera Aida (composed by Giuseppe Verdi) ex novo with new cast, set designs and 
costumes, under the stage direction of Franco Zeffirelli. By contrast, in 2006 the same theatre 
rented a production of Eugenio Oneghin that has already been staged by the Glyndebourne 
Festival Opera (EDT/CIDIM, 2006). We measure theatres’ willingness to mount new 
productions as the percentage of new productions staged by a theatre seasonally.  
Size. Size may affect the extent to which an opera company stages unconventional operas. 
As larger theatres have more resources and capabilities to foster innovation, size could 
decrease conventionality. At the same time, though, larger theatres may be more embedded 
in institutionalized frameworks that augment pressure to conform and resistance to change 
(DiMaggio and Stenberg, 1985; Pierce 2000). 
We used the total number of programmed runs to control for an opera house’s size. We 
measure this as the number of performance runs an opera house set up in the artistic season 
t. 
Coproductions. Coproducing operas with other theatres can lower the perception of risk 
related to unconventional opera programming which in turn enhances their openness to 
renew their repertoire. We measure theatres’ propensity to coproduce operas with other 
theatres as the percentage of coproduced operas in the repertoire. 
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix are presented in Table III. 
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----------------------------------- 
Insert Table III around here 
 
 
----------------------------------- 
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RESULTS 
 
Table IV presents the fixed-effects ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results (a 
Hausman test indicated that the fixed-effect model was more appropriate than random-
effects) (Stock and Watson, 2007). Model 1 in Table IV is a baseline model that contains only 
the control variables. In Model 2 (Table IV) we added the status of opera houses as an 
independent variable. As shown in this model, the linear relationship between opera houses’ 
status positions and nonconformity is not significant. In Model 3 (Table IV) we added the 
status position of opera houses and the status position squared as independent variables in 
our model in order to test the inverse U-shaped hypothesis, as well as the moderator 
aesthetic conventionality. In Model 4 (Table IV), in order to test the positive or negative 
moderating effect of aesthetic conventionality on the relationship between opera houses’ 
status and repertoire unconventionality, following Aiken, West and Raymon (1991), we 
computed the first and second order interaction between status and aesthetic 
conventionality. Model 4 –our full model – includes all controls, main effects and interaction 
terms.  All the variables have been standardized in order to guard against multicollinearity 
(Aiken, West and Raymon, 1991). (See Table VII of the robustness checks for the 
unstandardized regression coefficients).  
 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table IV around here 
                                                    ------------------------------------ 
 
Following Haans, Pieters and He (2015), we provided evidence of the existence of a 
curvilinear inversed U shaped relationship between status and nonconformity through a 
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three-step procedure. First, we analyzed the significance and sign of the coefficient of the 
independent variable status position squared. Second, we explored if the slope of the curve 
is sufficiently steep at both ends of the data range. In this regard, we performed the Lind and 
Melhum (2010) test to check if the slope of the curve is positive and significant at the low 
end of the data range and negative and significant at the high end of the data range. Finally, 
we considered if the turning point is located within the data range.  
Hypothesis 1 suggests the presence of an inverted U-shaped (IUS) relationship between 
an opera houses’ status position and repertoire unconventionality: middle status opera 
houses are more nonconforming with respect to high and low status opera houses. Model 4 
provides strong support for this hypothesis. As shown in Model 4 (Table IV), there is a 
statistically significant, positive relationship between status and repertoire 
unconventionality (β = 2.530, p < 0.001) and a negative and significant relationship between 
status squared and repertoire unconventionality (β = -2.461, p < 0.001). The latter 
relationship denotes the presence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between status and 
nonconformity, thereby supporting Hypothesis 1. Results of Lind and Melhum (2010) formal 
test for U shaped relationships further support our hypothesis (Table V): the slope of the 
curve is positive and significant at the lower bound of the unstandardized data range and 
negative and significant at the upper bound of the data range. The overall test of presence of 
an Inverted U-shaped is significant (t-value: 3.60; p < 0.001).  
 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table V around here 
                                                    ------------------------------------ 
 
Turning our attention to interpreting the inverted U-shaped curve’s turning point, we 
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found that the turning point is located almost in the middle of the status range. In particular, 
in our sample, the unstandardized status index ranges from 0 to 1, with a mid-range equal to 
0.5. The turning point is located at a level of status equal to 0.51 (meaning that 
nonconformity increases within the [1, 0.51] range of status, while decreases within the 
[0.51,1] range). This highlights that empirical results are in line with our argument that 
nonconformity increases up to moderate (mid-range) levels of status, and after that 
nonconformity starts to decline. Below the turning point rest 66% of our observations, while 
34% of them are above it. 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between status and repertoire unconventionality using 
the unstandardized estimates shown in column 15 of Table VII of the robustness check. This 
graph confirms that the nonconformity of opera repertoires is maximized at intermediate 
levels of status.  
 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 around here 
                                                    ------------------------------------ 
 
In Hypothesis 2 we argue that aesthetic conventionality moderates the IUS relationship 
between status and repertoire unconventionality in such a way that high and low but not 
moderate levels of status will positively relate to nonconformity. As suggested by Aiken, 
West and Raymon (1991), in interpreting the effect of aesthetic conventionality on the 
curvilinear inverse U-shaped relationship between status and repertoire unconventionality, 
we focus on the sign and significance of the second order interaction coefficients (i.e., 
squared term * moderator). As shown in Model 4 (Table IV) the interaction between opera 
houses’ status squared and aesthetic conventionality is positive and significant (status 
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squared * aesthetic conventionality: β = 1.907, p < 0.01). This suggests that at high levels of 
aesthetic conventionality middle status opera houses program less unconventional 
repertoires than at low levels of aesthetic conventionality. This provides support to our 
hypothesis.  
To make sure our results are robust, we performed several robustness checks and report 
them in Tables VI and VII. First, as a control for the moderating effect of aesthetic 
conventionality on the inversed U shaped relationship between status and repertoire 
unconventionality we create three subsamples, by dividing the sample in three status groups 
– high, middle and low - of the same size. We check if aesthetic conventionality moderates 
high, low and mid status opera houses’ propensity to program unconventional operas 
according to our prediction (Table VI). As can be observed in Model 7 (Table VI), aesthetic 
conventionality negatively moderates middle status theatres’ willingness to program 
unconventional operas (β = - 0.441, p < 0.01). Conversely, in model 9 aesthetic 
conventionality positively moderates both high and low status opera houses’ propensity to 
unconventional opera programming (β = 0.351, p < 0.05; β= 0.590, p  < 0.01). This provides 
further support to our predictions that at high levels of aesthetic conventionality, high and 
low but not middle levels of status will positively relate to repertoire unconventionality.  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table VI and Table VII around here 
------------------------------------ 
Second, we split the data based on the empirically determined turning point and we 
checked if two linear regressions give slopes that are consistent with the predicted shape of 
the curve. We found that regressions with status values below the turning point, indicate a 
positive relationship between status and repertoire unconventionality while regressions 
with status values above the turning point indicate a negative relationship between status 
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and repertoire unconventionality. This supports the existence of an inverted U shaped 
between status and nonconformity (see Table VII, Models 12 and 13).2 Finally, although the 
independent variables reported in Table III are only weakly correlated, we decided that in 
light of the quadratic coefficient and interaction in our model it is advisable to check for a 
multicollinearity effect on regression results. We developed a variance inflation factor (VIF) 
between the explanatory variables. Since none of the independent variables have VIF values 
greater than 10 (the average VIF value is equal to 1.42), we do not find evidence of 
multicollinearity (Hair et al., 1995). 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION: 
Our objective in this article was to understand how opportunities for status mobility 
triggered by the tension between competing status-based expectations shape the system of 
incentives for firms in different status positions to deviate from a dominant status based 
norm. We explore this relationship within the context of the Italian opera scene, where 
norm-breaking behaviors imply a betrayal of dominant audiences’ expectations for the 
conservation of a standard repertoire and the enactment of divergent audiences’ 
expectations for its artistic renewal.  
 We argue that the relationship between opera houses’ status and their willingness to 
program operas that deviate from the standard repertoire is inversed U-shaped.  The risk of 
status loss and the threat of social exclusion that stem from unconventional programming 
strategies encourage high and low status opera houses to signal conformity to dominant 
normative expectations for the conservation of the repertoire. Conversely, the potential for 
                                                        
2 As an additional robustness check we added a cubic term to equation 3 (model 4) to check whether the relationship between status and 
repertoire unconventionality is perhaps S-shaped rather than U-shaped. We found that the relationship between the cubic term of status 
and repertoire unconventionality is not significant.  
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consolidating and improving their social standing emboldens their middle status 
counterparts to embrace deviant normative expectations.  
We also argue that the extent to which opera houses adopt a taken for granted way of 
staging their repertoire alter the motivations for them to program unconventional operas by 
differentially affecting their ability to protect and advance their social position through the 
satisfaction of divergent audiences’ expectations. Our statistical analyses provide strong 
support for our theoretical arguments. Specifically, our analyses show that an increased 
commitment to conservative staging procedures that embody dominant audience 
expectations positively moderates the relationship between opera houses’ status and the 
unconventionality of their repertoires. Increasing the taken-for-granted aspects of the stage 
designs of their operas supports low and high status opera houses’ openness to the selection 
of unconventional titles, responding to their need to safeguard their social positions from the 
risk of social exclusion or status loss that may arise as a consequence of deviant behaviors. 
At the same time, though, by reducing the exposure of their unconventional titles among 
divergent segments of the audience, an increased commitment to the conservative stage 
designs restricts middle status organizations’ incentives to program unconventional operas.  
Our study contributes to literature on status and (non)conformity (Cancian, 1967; Dittes 
and Kelley, 1956; Jensen, 2006; Phillips, Turco and Zuckerman 2013; Phillips and 
Zuckerman, 2001) by examining this relationship under conditions of status instability and 
conflicting audiences’ expectations about status conferring actions. We also shed light on the 
commitment to conventional aesthetics and designs as an under-examined factor that affects 
the freedom of deviance of firms within unstable status hierarchies by reshuffling their 
incentives to infuse the contents of their offering with divergent normative prescriptions. In 
this regard, we contribute to shedding further light on the role of conformity as a driver for 
distinctiveness (Durand, Rao and Monin, 2007, Durand and Kremp, 2015) by emphasizing 
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how raising the taken-for-granted visual features of a firm’s offering may have an enabling 
vs. constraining role for the ability of firms in distinct status positions to achieve 
distinctiveness. 
In addition to these contributions discussed in the introduction of the paper, our research 
contributes more broadly to status theory as well. By showing that over-emphasizing 
recognizable visual forms enable high status organizations to deviate more easily from 
mainstream contents that embody dominant audiences’ expectations we identify an 
important, yet under-examined, condition that determines the extent to which the 
willingness to deviate of high status organizations is constrained vs. enhanced. Specifically, 
this condition is related to high status organizations’ ability to shape the interpretation of 
norm-breaking behaviors in the eyes of dominant audience segments by masking the 
potential controversial aspects of these behaviors through a legitimate way of presenting 
them. Status research highlights that having status may limit and constrain the opportunities 
and choices of action available to a firm (Sauder, Lynn and Podolny, 2012). In this regard we 
further contribute to better understanding the specific conditions under which having status 
constrains high status firms’ ability to behave differently in the market.  
Studies have already shown that high status positions at the top of the social system allow 
them greater control over how audiences perceive and make sense of their actions (Martin, 
2009). We add that the capacity of high status opera houses to manipulate how the audience 
interprets their actions have important consequences on the willingness of these firms to 
contradict the expectations of these audiences through norm-breaking behaviors. 
Specifically, adopting widely accepted designs and visual forms that change the 
interpretation that dominant audiences give to actions that contradict their interests is an 
important source of protection from the risk of downward mobility. High status 
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organizations can leverage conventional visual experiences to raise the unconventionality of 
their product offering.  
We also highlight the conditions under which not having status provides leeway for firms 
to violate dominant audiences’ expectations. In particular we emphasize that the threat of 
social exclusion that stems from the violation of dominant audiences’ expectations and the 
economic penalties that arise from it are strong incentives for low status firms to conform to 
these expectations. This relates to the fact that, although low status organizations have a low 
legitimacy that constrains their ability to be successful with a dominant audience, their 
deprivation of economic and reputational assets make them redouble their efforts to gain 
recognition among a wide audience by conforming to their prescriptions. We also point out 
that low status organizations’ ability to gain a minimum standard of social acceptability in 
the eyes of a dominant audience segments through the adoption of a socially accepted way 
of presenting the contents of their offering can fill their legitimacy-gap. This in turn boosts 
their freedom of deviance by creating barriers against the risk of social exclusion.  
Despite these contributions, our study also has limitations. First, we did not examine 
the process through which unconventional operas developed by middle status opera houses 
become consecrated over time and emulated by their high and low status peers. Future 
studies should explore how nonconformist productions, once adopted, diffuse throughout 
the organizational field. Second, we did not explore the artistic and commercial 
consequences of nonconformity for actors at the different levels of the status hierarchy. We 
strongly encourage future studies to explore the artistic and financial performance of 
nonconformity for opera houses in different status positions. Third, the decision to focus on 
a specific industry and geographic market may limit the generalizability of these findings. 
Studies re-assessing the relationship between status and nonconformity in different settings 
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shaped by similar contextual conditions will help to further test the generalizability of our 
findings. 
 
 
Mainstream Italian operas. Top 30 operas in Italy and number of productions. 2004-
2011 
Ranking Title Composer Number of productions 
1 La Bohème Puccini 50 
2 Madama Butterfly Puccini 50 
3 Tosca Puccini 49 
4 La Traviata Verdi 48 
5 Il Barbiere di Siviglia  Rossini 42 
6 Rigoletto Verdi 41 
7 Carmen Bizet 36 
8 Turandot Puccini 36 
9 Aida Verdi 31 
10 L'Elisir d'Amore  Donizetti 31 
11 Pagliacci Leoncavallo 29 
12 Don Giovanni Mozart 28 
13 Il Trovatore Verdi 28 
14 Cavalleria Rusticana Mascagni 25 
15 Nabucco Verdi 25 
16 Lucia di Lammermoor Donizetti 22 
17 Così Fan Tutte Ossia la Scuola degli Amanti Mozart 21 
18 Manon Lescaut Puccini 21 
19 La Cenerentola Rossini 20 
20 Le Nozze di Figaro Mozart 20 
21 Norma Bellini 20 
22 Don Pasquale Donizetti 19 
23 Gianni Schicchi Puccini 18 
24 Falstaff Mozart 17 
25 Macbeth Verdi 17 
26 Il Flauto Magico Mozart 16 
27 Il Ratto del Serraglio Mozart 14 
28 L'Italiana in Algeri Rossini 13 
29 Werther Massenet 13 
30 La Forza del Destino Verdi 12 
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Table II. Average relational status of Italian opera houses 
and percentage of popular operas in the repertoires, 2004-2011. 
Theatre Status % of Popular Operas 
Teatro alla Scala (Milan) 0.836 26% 
Teatro Regio  (Turin) 0.746 29% 
Teatro Comunale "L. Pavarotti" (Modena) 0.745 40% 
Teatro Amilcare Ponchielli (Cremona) 0.719 62% 
Ravenna Manifestazioni (Ravenna) 0.714 28% 
Teatro Grande (Brescia) 0.709 65% 
Teatro "G. Fraschini" (Pavia) 0.699 61% 
Teatro Sociale (Como) 0.694 55% 
Teatro Verdi (Trieste) 0.683 39% 
Teatro Massimo (Palermo) 0.586 41% 
Teatro Comunale (Bologna) 0.567 37% 
Teatro dell'Opera (Rome) 0.566 51% 
Teatro "C. Goldoni" (Livorno) 0.547 33% 
Arena di Verona 0.531 72% 
Teatro La Fenice (Venice) 0.529 26% 
Average 0.667 44% 
Teatro Verdi (Pisa) 0.497 31% 
Teatro Sociale (Rovigo) 0.493 31% 
Teatri di Piacenza 0.490 48% 
Teatro del Maggio Musicale Fiorentino 
(Florence) 
0.488 40% 
Teatro Comunale (Ferrara) 0.486 36% 
Teatro del Giglio (Lucca) 0.455 45% 
Teatro Regio (Parma) 0,419 48% 
Petruzzelli e Teatri di Bari 0.418 45% 
Teatro Carlo Felice (Genova) 0.415 49% 
I Teatri (Reggio Emilia) 0.354 28% 
Teatro di San Carlo (Naples) 0.347 39% 
Teatro G.B. Pergolesi (Jesi) 0.319 45% 
Teatro dell'Opera Giocosa (Savona) 0.272 47% 
Teatro Massimo Bellini (Catania) 0.271 42% 
Teatro Lirico (Cagliari) 0.243 43% 
Average 0.427 41% 
Teatro Comunale e Auditorium (Bolzano) 0.237 38% 
Teatro Donizetti (Bergamo) 0.237 48% 
Rossini Opera Festival (Pesaro) 0.189 11% 
Teatri S.P.A. (Treviso) 0.186 77% 
Sferisterio (Macerata) 0.161 48% 
Teatro Coccia (Novara) 0.158 53% 
Festival Pucciniano (Torre del Lago) 0.144 80% 
Marialisa de Carolis (Sassari) 0.122 34% 
Festival della Valle D'Itria 0.097 0% 
Teatro Alfondo Rendano (Cosenza) 0.053 73% 
Teatro Politeama Greco (Lecce) 0.051 55% 
Lirica in Piazza (Massa Marittima) 0.001 82% 
Average 0.153 50% 
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Table III. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Significance: †p < .10 
  
Variable 
 
 
Mean 
 
SD 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
 11 
 
1 
 
Repertoire 
conventionality 
 
-23.972 
 
13.936 
 
1 
          
 
2 
 
Status 
 
 
0.416 
 
0.275 
 
0.134† 
 
1 
 
 
   
 
 
     
 
3 
 
Aesthetic conventionality 
 
0.989 
 
0.439 
 
-0.327† 
 
-0.029 
 
 
1 
 
 
       
 
4 
 
Structural holes 
 
0.286 
 
0.134 
 
-0.277† 
 
-0.515† 
 
0.185† 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
5 
 
Private funding 
 
0.091 
 
0.085 
 
0.018 
 
0.062 
 
0.047 
 
 
 
0.034 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
6 
Box office 0.151 0.126 -0.336† -0.012 0.111 0.128† 0.001 1      
7 
State funding 0.347 0.177 0.041 0.166† -0.066 -0.187† -0.286† -0.127† 1     
8 
Artistic merit 0.280 0.450 0.215† 0.446† -0.034 -0.182† 0.190† -0.035 
0.116† 
 
1    
9 
Coproduction 0.464 0.360 
0.133† 
 
0.260† -0.188† -0.262† 0.057 -0.042 -0.284† -0.194 1   
10 
Repertoire size 5.799 2.846 0.142† 
0.482† 
 
0.010 -0.279† 0.055 -0.000 0.345† 0.347† -0.163† 1  
11 
New Production 0.389 0.296 0.297† -0.125† -0.142† -0.037 -0.009 -0.152† 0.193† 0.158† -0.303† 0.136† 1 
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Table IV. Model Estimation. The effect of opera houses’ status on repertoire 
unconventionality  
and the moderating role of aesthetic conventionality 
 
 Independent Variable: Repertoire 
Unconventionality 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Independent variables   
Status - -0.007 
(-0.07) 
0.939* 
(2.54) 
  2.530*** 
(4.05) 
Status Squared - - -0.820** 
(-2.66) 
-2.461*** 
(-3.97) 
Aesthetic conventionality - - -0.007 
(-0.13) 
0.405* 
(2.63) 
Interaction effect   
Status *Aesthetic conventionality - - - -2.012** 
(-3.11) 
Status squared* Aesthetic conventionality - - - 1.907** 
(3.06) 
Control variables     
Repertoire Size 0.286** 
(2.66) 
0.285** 
(2.63) 
0.261* 
(2.43) 
0.266* 
(2.55) 
New Production 0.141* 
(1.99) 
0.141 † 
(1.98) 
0.133 † 
(1.89) 
0.123† 
(1.79) 
Structural Holes -0.162 
 (-1.21) 
-0.167 
(-0.08) 
0.008 
(0.05) 
0.015 
(0.10) 
Artistic Merit -0.056 
 (-0.76) 
-0.053 
(-0.66) 
0.009 
(0.12) 
0.020 
(0.26) 
State Funding 0.097 
(0.70) 
0.097 
(0.69) 
0.068 
(0.49) 
0.129 
(0.94) 
Private Funding -0.046 
  (-0.42) 
-0.047 
(-0.43) 
-0.036 
(-0.34) 
-0.051 
(-0.48) 
Box Office  -0.254* 
(-2.00) 
-0.254* 
(-1.99) 
-0.259* 
( -2.05) 
-0.224† 
(-1.81) 
Coproduction  -0.010 
(-0.11) 
-0.011 
(-0.11) 
-0.019 
(-0.21) 
0.027 
(0.29) 
Time dummies Included Included Included Included 
Constant 0.163 
(1.49) 
0.162 
(1.47) 
0.133 
(1.22) 
0.088 
(0.83) 
No. of observations 201 201 201 201 
R-sq 0.178 0.178 0.218 0.268 
F 2.66** 2.44** 2.68** 3.06*** 
Significance: 
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; †p < .10; t-statistic in parenthesis. Standardized regression 
coefficients 
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Table. V Lind and Melhum test for inversed U-shaped 
 
 Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Interval 0 1 
Slope 127.984 -121.499 
t-value 4.050 -3.597 
P > |t| 0.000 0.000 
 
Overall test of presence of an inversed U-shaped 
 
t-value 3.60 
P > |t| 0.000 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The curvilinear Inverted U-Shaped relationship  
between status and repertoire unconventionality  
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Table VI. Robustness Check. The moderating effect of aesthetic conventionality on 
   high, low and middle status repertoires’ unconventionality.  
Results of moderated regression analysis 
 
 Dependent Variable: Repertoire unconventionality  
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Independent Variables       
High status  - - - -0.066 
(-0.89) 
-0.357* 
(-2.27) 
Middle status  - 0.138* 
(2.25) 
0.518*** 
(4.06) 
 
- - 
 
Low status  - - - -0.212* 
(-2.43) 
-0.654*** 
(-4.33) 
Aesthetic conventionality - -0.012 
(-0.22) 
-0.111† 
(-1.68) 
-0.013 
(-0.23) 
-0.273** 
(-2.94) 
Interactions Effects      
High Status *Aesthetic 
conventionality 
- -  
- 
- 0.351* 
(2.19) 
Middle Status * Aesthetic 
conventionality 
- - -0.441** 
(-3.37) 
- - 
Low Status * Aesthetic 
conventionality 
- - - - 0.590** 
(3.56) 
Control Variables 
 
     
Repertoire Size 0.286** 
(2.66) 
0.277** 
(2.59) 
0.305** 
(2.95) 
0.279** 
(2.62) 
0.296** 
(2.85) 
New Production 0.141* 
(1.99) 
0.128† 
(1.80) 
0.109 
(1.59) 
0.129† 
(1.82) 
0.114† 
(1.67) 
Structural Holes -0.162 
(-1.21) 
-0.145 
(-1.09) 
-0.154 
(-1.20) 
-0.041 
(-0.27) 
-0.077 
(0.53) 
Artistic Merit -0.056 
(-0.76) 
-0.022 
(-0.29) 
-0.001 
(-0.02) 
-0.039 
(-0.52) 
-0.030 
(0.41) 
State Funding 0.097 
(0.70) 
0.068 
(0.49) 
0.129 
(0.95) 
0.064 
(0.46) 
0.140 
(1.03) 
Private Funding -0.046 
(-0.42) 
-0.053 
(-0.50) 
-0.057 
(-0.56) 
-0.031 
(-0.29) 
-0.037 
(-0.36) 
Box Office  -0.254* 
(-2.00) 
-0.253* 
(-2.00) 
-0.242† 
(-1.98) 
-0.255* 
(-2.01) 
-0.239* 
( -1.95) 
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Coproduction  -0.010 
(-0.11) 
-0.023 
(-0.24) 
0.016 
(0.18) 
-0.027 
(-0.29) 
0.031 
(0.34) 
Time dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant 0.163 
(1.49) 
0.121 
(1.11) 
0.089 
(0.84) 
0.133 
(1.21) 
0.121 
 (1.14) 
No. of observations 201 201 201 201 201 
R-sq 0.178 0.207 0.265 0.214 0.280 
F 2.66** 2.71** 3.46*** 2.61** 3.25*** 
 
Significance: 
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; †p < .10; t-statistic in parenthesis. Standardized regression 
coefficients.
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Table VII. Robustness check. The effect of opera houses’ status on repertoire 
unconventionality and the moderating role of aesthetic conventionality. Unstandardized 
Regression Coefficients 
 
   Dep Variable: Repertoire Unconventionality 
 Model 
10 
Model 
11 
Model 12 
Subsample1 
Model 13 
Subsample2 
Model 14 Model 15 
Independent variables     
Status - -0.366 
(-0.07) 
-5.526 
(-0.55) 
31.427* 
(2.09) 
47.493* 
(2.54) 
127.984*** 
(4.05) 
Status Squared - - - - -41.5770** 
(-2.66) 
-124.742*** 
(-3.97) 
Aesthetic 
Conventionality 
- - - - -0.234 
(-0.13) 
12.731 
(-2.63) 
Interaction effect     
Status *Aesthetic 
Conventionality 
- - - - - -81.387** 
(-3.11) 
Status squared* 
Aesthetic 
Conventionality 
- - - - - 82.466** 
(3.06) 
Control variables       
Repertoire Size 1.400** 
(2.66) 
1.397** 
(2.63) 
0.733 
(0.72) 
1.792* 
(2.14) 
1.277* 
(2.43) 
1.305* 
(2.55) 
New Production 6.641* 
(1.99) 
6.629 † 
(1.98) 
0.151 
(0.03) 
7.321 
(1.66) 
6.273 † 
(1.89) 
     5.822† 
(1.79) 
Structural Holes -16.812 
 (-1.21) 
-17.380 
(-0.08) 
-21.863 
(-0.36) 
3.198 
(0.16) 
0.861 
(0.05) 
1.629 
(0.10) 
Artistic Merit -1.740 
 (-0.76) 
-1.666 
(-0.66) 
-2.55 
(-0.80) 
2.776 
(0.70) 
0.299 
(0.12) 
0.649 
(0.26) 
State Funding 7.698 
(0.70) 
7.690 
(0.69) 
  4.893 
(0.16) 
-10.872 
(-0.68) 
5.399 
(0.49) 
10.157 
(0.94) 
Private Funding -7.512 
  (-0.42) 
-7.677 
(-0.43) 
11.340 
(0.39) 
-2.867 
(-0.09) 
-5.995 
(-0.34) 
-8.335 
(-0.48) 
Box Office  -28.043* 
(-2.00) 
-28.027* 
(-1.99) 
11.849 
(0.28) 
-45.461* 
(-2.56) 
-28.628* 
( -2.05) 
-24.783† 
(-1.81) 
Coproduction  -0.415 
(-0.11) 
-0.425 
(-0.11) 
0.707 
(0.12) 
-3.231 
(-0.60) 
-0.753 
(-0.21) 
1.056 
(0.29) 
Time dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant -24.633** 
(-2.98) 
-24.307* 
(-2.57) 
-23.442 
(-1.19) 
-30.853 
(-2.18) 
-38.120** 
(-3.27) 
-54.719*** 
(4.56) 
No. of observations 201 201 70 131 201 201 
R-sq 0.178 0.178 0.147 0.282 0.218 0.268 
F 2.66** 2.44** 0.44 2.42** 2.68** 3.06*** 
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; †p < .10; t-statistic in parenthesis. Subsample 1: turning point > 
0.51 ; Subsample 2: turning point < 0.51 
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Giving La Traviata a Contemporary twist?  
How Legitimate Unconventionality Shapes Hybridity in Italian Opera 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: 
 
Categories are cognitive lenses that help the audience to identify and group products and 
organizations together (Durand and Paolella, 2012; Vergne and Wry, 2014; Zhao, Ishihara 
and Lounsbury, 2013). Categories define legitimate attributes and actions possible for their 
members (Durand, Rao and Monin, 2007; Polos et al., 2002) and shape organizations’ market 
identities by clarifying what to expect from organizations and products that claim 
membership in a given category (Jensen, Kim and Kim, 2011). Research in this tradition 
suggests simultaneously positioning products across different categories (a phenomenon 
called category spanning) (Hsu, Negro and Perretti, 2012), confuses the audience and 
exposes organizations to social and economic penalties (Zuckerman, 1999; Hsu, 2006). 
Despite this empirical regularity, recent category studies have started to explore the factors 
that mitigate the negative effect of spanning. Most of these studies focus on category 
structure (e.g., degree of contrast and similarities between categories) as playing a central 
role in determining the consequences of this practice  (Kovacs and Hannan, 2010; Hsu, 
Negro and Perretti, 2012; Kovacs and Hannan, 2015; Lounsbury and Wry, 2013). Few studies 
have started to analyze how organizations can act strategically to overcome the penalties of 
spanning and enable hybridity (Zhao, Ishihara and Lounsbury, 2013). Within this strategic 
perspective, however, no study has investigated how organizations can emphasize different 
attributes of a legitimate category that defines their identities to offset the negative 
consequences of category spanning and facilitate the adoption of this practice. 
We address this question by investigating how strategically emphasizing elements that, 
although belonging to a legitimate category where organizations claim membership, exhibit 
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different degree of conventionality affects organizations’ ability to pursue hybridity and 
draw attention to boundary spanning products. In doing so, we shift focus from symmetric 
to asymmetric forms of spanning where one category anchors interpretations but it is 
modified by the codes of another one (Vergne and Wry, 2014; Lounsbury and Wry, 2014). 
Specifically we highlight the case where organizations reinterpret a legitimate category that 
defines their identities through the lens of a rival one. This form of spanning not only 
confuses the audience but also triggers external sanctions because it implies a violation of 
broad societal expectations and consensus about actions that are appropriate for 
organizations that claim a given identity (Jensen, Kim and Kim, 2011; Kim and Jensen, 2013). 
At the same time, it raises authenticity challenges by altering the rules of conducts of a 
category where organizations legitimately claim membership while giving rise to a rival 
interpretation of the same category (Negro, Hannan and Rao, 2010; Carroll and 
Swaminathan, 2000).   
Drawing on a recent notion of conventionality defined as the adoption of highly salient 
and prominent features (Durand and Kremp, 2015), we contend that emphasizing 
conventional features of a legitimate category that shapes organizations’ market identity 
makes it difficult to reinterpret them through the codes of a rival category. By contrast, 
emphasizing features that are less conventional but still respect the codes of that category is 
a viable vehicle to pursue this form of hybridity. Conventional features that are more 
representative of a legitimate type carry with them strong and broad societal expectations 
(Jensen and Kim, 2011; Durand and Kremp, 2015) which renders deviation from those 
expectations more prominent and subject to sanction, placing constraints on hybridization. 
Accentuating unconventional features instead raises the importance of elements that are less 
emblematic of a category where organizations legitimately claim membership which confers 
them leeway to reinterpret that category through a divergent lens.  
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We also posit that reinterpretations of a category that shapes organizations’ identity 
through an oppositional lens positively contributes to raise audience attention when they 
coalesce around features that are more unconventional than those distinguishing original 
interpretations of the same category. This may in fact enable organizations to hide standards 
of comparisons between conflicting interpretations of the same category, protecting hybrids 
from being perceived as illegitimate and inauthentic or fake. At the same time, this 
mechanism boosts the perception of innovativeness and freshness of the hybridization 
process itself which positively contributes to an organization’s performance (Hsu, Negro 
and Hannan, 2012). This especially holds true when organizations position themselves in a 
closed social network of relationships which facilitates reciprocity (Coleman, 1985) and the 
adoption of cooperative behaviors (Granovetter, 1985) aimed at promoting innovative efforts 
stemming from hybridity and raising audiences’ attention around them.  
This study contributes to research on multiple category membership in markets (Durand 
and Paolella, 2012; Vergne and Wry, 2014; Kovacs and Hannan, 2014; Lounsbury and Wry, 
2013; Lounsbury and Wry, 2014; Negro, Hannan and Rao, 2011). Specifically, we contribute 
to advance studies on how firms can act strategically to alter perceptions about boundary 
spanning products and draw external attention to them. Instead of examining how firms can 
strategically signal affiliations with a legitimate category to offset the negative consequences 
of spanning, we highlight how firms can strategically modify their position within a 
category to mitigate the negative effects of this practice. We also shed light on how this 
mechanism is influenced by the extent to which firms position themselves in a close vs. open 
network of relationships.  
We test our hypotheses with data on the Italian opera market from 2004 to 2011. We begin 
by theorizing why selecting unconventional features from a legitimate category enables 
organizations to reinterpret them through the codes of an oppositional category. We also 
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theorize why and under which social conditions offering hybrid reinterpretations of a 
legitimate category whose features are more unconventional than those identifying its 
original interpretation enhances organizations’ ability to attract audiences’ attention. We end 
our study by discussing the implications of our findings for research and practice, 
examining limitations and making suggestions for future research.  
 
 
 
 
HYPOTHESES: UNCONVENTIONALITY  
 AND CATEGORY SPANNING 
 
 
Categories represent meaningful consensus about products and organizations’ features as 
shared by actors grouped together as an audience (Durand and Paolella, 2013). By driving 
external beliefs and expectations about organizations’ characteristics and behaviors, 
membership in categories shapes organizations’ market identities (Jensen, Kim and Kim, 
2011). Practices that conform to the social codes inherent in established categorization 
systems are easier for market audiences to identify. Thus, by developing products that 
conform to well-accepted standard categories firms enhance their legitimacy and prospect of 
success (Zuckerman, 1999; Hsu, Hannan and Koçac, 2009).  
Conversely, firms may sometimes decide to mix the characteristic features of existing 
categories, simultaneously positioning their offer across multiple product categories, a 
phenomenon called category spanning. This gives rise to hybrids that provide new 
dimensions to traditional categories through the recombination of commonly understood 
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and established categorization systems (Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Haveman & Rao, 2006; 
Hsu et. al, 2012). This blending mechanism is widely regarded as a source of innovation 
(Rao, Monin and Durand, 2005) and fosters the development of products with high 
fuzziness, weaker boundaries and partial memberships because members of one category 
may be exposed to elements belonging to other categories (Hannan, Polos and Carroll, 2007; 
Negro, Hannan and Rao, 2010). For example Rao, Monin and Durand  (2005) analyzed 
blending processes in the French Haute cuisine, exploring the erosion of categorical 
boundaries that divided classical and nouvelle cuisine as a result of a borrowing process that 
blurred the boundaries between these categories by binding together their elements and 
techniques. Similarly, the establishment of the new “Indian modern art” (Khaire and 
Wadhwani, 2010) was initiated by the mixing of traits from “Indian” and “modern Western” 
categories. 
A large body of works has explored category spanning. These studies mainly focus on the 
negative consequences of multiple category membership which in turn disincentives firms 
to span categories. Organizations and products that mix categories may be more difficult to 
make sense of than category purists, thus they result in poor evaluation (Rao, Durand and 
Monin, 2005),    inattention (Zuckerman, 1999) and legitimacy challenges (Greenwood, 
Sudday and Hinings 2002).  
Recently, attention has begun to shift from the negative effects of spanning to the factors 
that may potentially mitigate them. Most of these studies shed light on category structure 
and audience perception as playing a central role in attenuating the penalties of spanning. 
For example, it has been noted that the effects of spanning are mitigated when categories 
have low contrast (Kovacs and Hannan, 2010), when they exhibit similarities (Wry and 
Lounbury, 2013) or when the audience positively evaluate how the categories fit together 
(Wry and Lounsbury, 2014). Drawing on a strategic categorization perspective, few studies 
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have started to analyze how organizations can act strategically to overcome the penalties of 
spanning and enable hybridity. Within this perspective, studies  have mainly focused on the 
use of naming strategies to signal affiliations with existing legitimate categories (Zhao, 
Ishihara and  Lounsbury, 2013; Smith and Chae, 2015).  
We, instead, focus on how firms can strategically emphasize different elements of a 
category that shapes their market identities as a way of enabling hybridity and drawing 
external attention to it. In doing so, we shift attention from a symmetric to an asymmetric 
form of spanning where a category is reinterpreted through the lens of a different one. This 
structure has been documented by Lounsbury and Wry (2014) who showed how science 
start up firms secured technology patents as a way to translate their basic science in applied 
products: in this case science was reinterpreted through a technological lens. We highlight 
the case where a legitimate category that defines a firm identity is reinterpreted through the 
lens of a rival one: in this case the category that anchors interpretation is different, 
oppositional from the one that defines the identity of organizations.  
When organizations that claim membership in a category reinterpret its codes through 
those of an oppositional one, they give rise to a rival interpretation of that category that 
contaminates its rule of conducts and departs from a credible representation of that category 
in the eyes of the external audience (Peterson, 1997; Negro, Hannan and Rao, 2011). As a 
result it may be discarded by an audience who is accustomed to the original interpretation. 
This for example occurred when industrial brewers made claim of being authentic craft 
brewers and develop artisanal productions  but they did not hold or own brewing facilities 
or made their own beers (Carroll and Swaminathan, 2000), or when traditional winemakers 
reinterpret traditional practices for making Barolo and Barbaresco wines through a 
modernist style (Negro, Hannan and Rao, 2011). This form of spanning confuses the 
audience and may be explicitly devalued because it undermines the authenticity of 
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organizations’ membership in a category that shapes their identities and implies the 
violation of attributes that are legitimately possessed by these organizations (Jensen, Kim 
and Kim, 2011). This in turn may act as a constraint on organizations’ decision to undertake 
it.  
We contend that organizations have more leeway to reinterpret the features of a 
legitimate category that shapes their identity through the lens of an oppositional one when 
they emphasize features that, although respecting the codes of that category, are 
unconventional. By contrast, an excessive emphasis on the most salient, emblematic features 
of a legitimate category that defines their identity enhances the potential penalties faced by 
organizations that pursue this form of hybridity. Highlighting conventional features of a 
legitimate category that builds their identity means emphasizing the core aspects of their 
identity and the most representative elements of a legitimate type (DiMaggio and Stenberg, 
1985) which confers them increased status. Indeed, studies have shown that status may be 
acquire through category attributes that are deemed more valuable than others because they 
embody a high degree of consensus about how a firm should behave (e.g., being a 
blockbuster producing film studio) (Jasso, 2001). At the same time, though, an increased 
status makes firms more conspicuous in the eyes of the external audience who have higher 
expectations towards these organizations (Jensen, Kim and Kim, 2011). This in turn exposes 
them to penalties and external sanctions for violating core aspects of their identities (Jensen, 
Kim and Kim, 2011; Hsu and Hannan, 2005) which de-incentivizes organizations’ attempts 
to reinterpret these attributes through a divergent, oppositional lens. For example, Durand, 
Rao and Monin (2007), found that attempts by high status restaurants to change the social 
codes that defined the core aspects of their market identities tend to receive less positive 
evaluations.  
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Conversely, accentuating the unconventional features of a legitimate category that 
delineates organizations’ identity give firms leeway to reinterpret that category through the 
codes of a divergent one. Emphasizing those features, in fact, means unveiling peripheral 
identity markers and raising the importance of elements that, although respecting legitimate 
category codes, are less emblematic of that category. These elements preserve organizations’ 
membership in a category that shapes their identity, thus protecting their legitimacy and 
facilitating positive external evaluations (Durand, Rao and Monin, 2007) while at the same 
time being characterized by a high degree of newness. This makes organizations that adopt 
them less conspicuous and subject to high expectations which free their ability to reinterpret 
these attributes through a divergent lens.  
On these grounds, we argue that organizations’ decisions to emphasize unconventional 
features of a legitimate category that shapes their identity enables them to reinterpret that 
category through a divergent category lens because it reduces the potential negative effect of 
this practice.  
We argue: 
Hypothesis 1: The higher organizations’ willingness to emphasize the unconventional features of a 
legitimate category that defines their identity, the higher their ability to reinterpret that category 
through a rival one.  
 
We also contend that reinterpretations of a category that shapes organizations’ identity 
through an oppositional lens positively contribute to raise audience attention when they 
coalesce around features that are more unconventional than those distinguishing original 
interpretations of the same category. When the reinterpreted features are more 
unconventional than those to which the original interpretation is applied, they are regarded 
and understood as more innovative in nature rather than emulative of existing models 
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(Durand and Kremp, 2015; Di Maggio and Stenberg, 1985), which in turn facilitates the 
success of hybrids and their positive contributions to an organization’s performance (Hsu, 
Negro and Perretti, 2012). Moreover, this mechanism enables organizations to gain the 
benefit of differentiation that stems from hybridity (Hsu, Negro and Perretti, 2012) while 
escaping the penalties that arise from violating the rule of conducts of a category that defines 
organizations’ identity. The reason is that reinterpreting features that are more 
unconventional than those identifying the original interpretation of that category acts as a 
camouflage signal (Connelly et al., 2011) that disguises the liability of this form of spanning 
through the hybridization of features that are less core and representative of organizations’ 
identity which renders hybridity less prominent and sanctionable. At the same time, the 
higher degree of unconventionality of the reinterpreted features compared to those 
identifying the original interpretation creates a perceptual detachment between rival 
interpretations of a category that defines organizations’ identity. This obstructs audiences’ 
ability to compare and evaluate hybrid reinterpretations of this category against the original, 
safeguarding hybrids from being perceived as not credible representations of that category 
in the eyes of the external audience.  
We argue: 
Hypothesis 2: The higher organizations’ willingness to create hybrid reinterpretation of a 
legitimate category that defines their identity whose features are more unconventional compared with 
those distinguishing the original interpretation of that category, the higher their ability to attract the 
external audience attention.  
Finally, we contend that when organizations are part of a closed network of relationships 
reinterpreting a legitimate category whose features are more unconventional compared with 
those distinguishing purist interpretation of that category has a stronger effect on audiences’ 
attraction. In closed social network of relationships organizations tend to be partners (Baum, 
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Liere and Rowley, 2006) which facilitates reciprocity, trust (Coleman, 1985) and the adoption 
of cooperative behaviors (Granovetter, 1985) in a supportive social context (Edmondson, 
1999). Closed networks also simplify the transfer and exchange of fine-grained knowledge 
which tends to be tacit or complex (Ajuha, 2000; Walker et al., 1997) which is particularly 
relevant to further enhance the success of hybrid reinterpretations of a category that are 
externally perceived as highly innovative because detached from previous benchmark of 
comparisons. Being part of a closed network may in fact enable organizations to acquire 
knowledge about how to promote innovative hybrids and how to maximize the attraction of 
audiences’ attention on them. When organizations are part of closed network of 
relationships it is also more common for them to engage in large relationship-specific 
investments that help maximize the benefits of collaboration (Walker, Cogut and Shan, 
1997). In this regard, organizations that are part of closed networks may also decide to co-
brand innovative hybrids which implies coordinated and reinforced communication efforts 
aimed at maximizing the marketplace exposure of organizations’ products (Washburn, Till 
and Priluck, 2000). In sum we contend that when organizations offer hybrid 
reinterpretations of a category that are perceptually detached from their original 
interpretations, audiences’ curiosity and attention toward these efforts are particularly 
enhanced when organizations position themselves within closed networks of relationships.  
We argue: 
Hypothesis 3: The higher organizations’ willingness to reinterpret a legitimate category that 
defines their identity whose features are more unconventional compared with those distinguishing the 
original interpretation of that category and the closer their network of relationship, the higher their 
ability to attract the external audience attention.  
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THE EMPIRICAL CONTEXT 
The empirical setting of our research is the Italian opera market from 2004 to 2011. Italian 
opera houses’ market identities is highly traditional and focused on historically operas of the 
pre-20th century tradition. Traditional operas reflect the prevailing logic of preservation of a 
historically established operatic patrimony that reflects broad audiences’ tastes and 
constitutes the bulk of Italian opera houses’ artistic programs (Cancellieri and Turrini, 2016). 
By contrast, modern 20th century operas define themselves as a divergent and oppositional 
genre that responds to the need for developing and innovating the operatic genre through 
disruptive schema shaped by a contemporary style of music and drama (e.g., atonal system 
of music expression, antitheatrical oratorio like appearance, aesthetics of difficulty and 
nonbeauty, intent to provoque and scandalize the audience (Lindenberger, 2007; Jensen and 
Kim, 2013). Over the last year the necessity for Italian theatres to recombine the logics of 
conservation and development of the opera patrimony while distinguishing themselves 
from their peers has encouraged them to produce modern reinterpretations of traditional, 
pre-20th century operas conferring this repertoire a modern and contemporary visual 
dimension “by putting old wine in new bottles” (Gossett, 2010; Heilbrun, 1993). For 
example, staging the 19th century opera La Traviata in the present and making the 
protagonists feel contemporary (Loomis, 2013) is an example of modern reinterpretations of 
traditional operas. Similarly, staging Mozart’s Don Giovanni as a New York drug dealer is 
another example of this practice in the field of opera (Jensen and Kim, 2013). Opera houses’ 
managers believe this strategy has the potential to foster the accessibility of a cultural 
product that for a long time has been conceived as an exclusive and elitist art form, while at 
the same time contributing to the development of a conservative artistic genre (Pogue and 
Speck, 1997:7). The aim of modern staging in the opera field has been clearly expressed by 
Stephane Lissner, the former chairman of La Scala theatre in Milan: “setting side by side the 
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repertoire and the modern day is part of the Scala’s mission, not repeating the same show as 
the conservatives would like” (Biennie, 2013). In a similar vein, the former chairman of 
Teatro dell’ Opera in Rome noted “we’re trying to merry traditional Italian opera with a 
more modern vision of what a theatre can be, recovering our credibility and searching for 
different audiences in the meantime” (Povoledo, 2013).  
Staging modern reinterpretations of traditional operas may, however, expose opera 
houses to external criticism. Both critics and experts as well the general audience converge in 
judging modern reinterpretations of traditional operas as inauthentic attempts to bastardize 
the visual dimension of tradition through the creation of trivial shows that trigger a succèss 
de scandale instead of contributing to the artistic development of the field. Not surprisingly 
modern stagings are often negatively received by the audience who are reluctant to accept 
unpopular, unfamiliar artistic choices. For example, when in 2014 La Scala opened its artistic 
season with a modern staging of La Traviata by Giuseppe Verdi, the famous boo-ing of La 
Scala’s loggionisty including conservative audience segments arise as a sign of criticism 
against the contemporary visual reinterpretation of this classic. Strong concerns were 
expressed by critics as well. Carla Fracci, the famous Italian dancer noted: “I am 
conservative, I am for the respect of tradition. This modern staging of La Traviata betrayed 
the meaning of Verdi’s opera”. In a similar vein, Giorgio Armani reported: “I was puzzled 
by this production….I think it betrayed the very spirit of the opera”. Similarly, the famous 
conductor Muti expressed his disappointment against a production which “offended Verdi 
and the Italian opera tradition”.  
Despite the potential penalties that stems from the creation of modern staging of 
traditional operas, opera houses still pursue this strategy. What therefore enables theatres to 
mitigate the sanctions that stem from this practice, making it being perceived as a less risky 
and more rewarding strategic path? Drawing on the notion of unconventionality first 
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introduced by DiMaggio and Stenberg (1985) and further developed by Jensen and Kim 
(2011) and Durand and Kremp (2015), we contend that opera houses have less incentives to 
create modern reinterpretations of traditional repertoires when they raise the 
conventionality of traditional operas. Increasing the conventionality of traditional opera 
titles means choosing a small sets of operas that are performed frequently because they are 
the most salient and widely known identifiers of tradition among a broad audience (Jensen 
and Kim, 2013; Kim and Jensen, 2011). For example, in the Italian opera field, the 
masterpieces of Puccini and Verdi such as La Traviata and Madama Butterfly continue to be 
the “Opera ABC” for commercial success and their inclusion in the repertoire satisfies the 
taste of a wide audience for “opera warhorses”.  
An increased focus on conventional opera titles implies an emphasis on highly salient and 
emblematic features (e.g., La Traviata and Madama Butterfly) that best fit the codes of 
tradition in the audiences’ mental representation system. These titles have in fact become the 
most emblematic and taken for granted representations of tradition among the audience. 
Programming these titles thus raises the external audiences’ expectations to see the codes of 
tradition being respected in their purist form. As a result the audience adopt taken for 
granted standards of comparisons against which they can evaluate, judge and eventually 
sanction performances of these operas that do not comply with their original form. By 
contrast, by programming under-performed pre-20th century operas such as Il Fidelio or La 
Finta Giardiniera, theatres draw attention away from the liability of conferring a modern 
visual reinterpretation to traditional operas. As unconventional operas have been 
unfrequently represented in their purist form, their association with the purist schema of 
tradition is less evident which in turn obstructs audiences’ ability to evaluate modern 
reinterpretations of these operas against their original schema.  For example, when an opera 
house or a symphony orchestra select their repertoires focusing on the most representative 
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operas of the classic music tradition (Jensen and Kim, 2011; Durand and Kremp, 2015) they 
promote their status and visibility among a broad audience which creates strong external 
expectations about their compliance with the canon of tradition. At the same time, these 
highly familiar masterpieces of the music tradition can be easily recognized and evaluated 
by the external audience who can compare them with other performances of the same 
masterpiece (Durand and Kremp, 2015). This in turn may foster the sanctionability of 
attempts to reinterpret those features through a modern aesthetic canon.  
As a result, the risk for these titles to be considered by broad audiences as inauthentic 
with respect to the codes of tradition is lower. In this scenario opera houses’ ability to 
propose modern reinterpretations of those titles is enhanced.  
Furthermore we argue that when opera houses increase the offering of modern 
reinterpretations of traditional operas whose titles are more unconventional compared with 
those identifying purist-traditional operas in the same opera season their ability to attract the 
audience is higher. This mechanism boosts opera houses’ ability to achieve distinctiveness 
by recombining divergent prescriptions (i.e., artistic originality vs. preservation of tradition) 
embodied in the codes of traditional and modern operas (Jensen and Kim, 2013) through 
modern reinterpretations of tradition, while avoiding the risk for these performances to be 
conceived as inauthentic and devalued by the external audience. Indeed when modern 
reinterpretations of tradition are identified by titles that are more unconventional compared 
with those distinguishing purist traditional operas the perceptual detachment between the 
rival interpretations of traditional operas (hybrid modern vs. purist traditional) is higher. 
This emphasizes the innovativeness of modern reinterpretations of a traditional repertoires 
compared with purist interpretations of the same repertoire which protects modern 
reinterpretations of tradition from being externally perceived as inauthentic. At the same 
time this mechanism enables theatres to signal the innovativeness of their programs through 
62  
the modernist reinterpretations of traditional titles that would otherwise remained forgotten 
or hidden to the external audience attention (DiMaggio and Stenberg, 1985). When opera 
houses are part of a closed network of relationships their willingness to program modern 
reinterpretations of titles with a higher degree of unconventionality than those identifying 
purist traditional repertoires has a stronger effect on occupancy rate. Closed social network 
of relationships facilitates reciprocity, trust (Coleman, 1985) and the adoption of cooperative 
behaviors (Granovetter, 1985) in a supportive social context (Edmondson, 1999). When opera 
houses are part of closed network of relationships (e.g., Italian Circuiti Teatrali) they often 
coproduce show or, alternatively, distribute or acquire newly produced operas to the other 
theatres of the network (Mariani, 2007). The consequences of these cooperative behaviors are 
twofold. First, opera houses can share knowledge about how to appropriately promote 
innovative reinterpretations of modern repertoires that could maximize their ability to 
attract the audience and raise their occupancy rate. Second they can arrange common 
promotional strategies, coordinated communication efforts (Cori, 2004) and co-branding 
strategies aimed at gathering further attention around innovative shows. 
 
 
METHODS 
 
Sample 
 
Nowadays Italian opera houses are a fragmented sector, characterized by an offer shared 
between different non-profit institutions (Sicca and Zan, 2005). Our sample is composed by 
the most important professional Italian opera houses (i.e., Lyric and Symphonic foundations, 
Teatri di Tradizione) and operatic festivals. The Lyric and Symphonic Foundations (LSF) are 
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private foundations located in the largest Italian towns. By contrast, Teatri di Tradizione 
(TDTs) are usually smaller than LSFs in size, and mainly located in medium size cities. 
Given the relevance of festivals for the Italian operatic tradition and for the artistic 
development of the field, we decided to include them in our sample. Operatic festivals are 
realized in a limited timeframe and located in distinct geographic area. Both  LSFs, TDTs 
and festivals receive significant funding from public bodies at both national and local levels. 
We excluded from our sample ‘lirica ordinaria’, small-scale theatres with short seasons that 
sporadically include operas in their repertoires. Moreover, we did not consider Accademia S. 
Cecilia in Rome, a lyric and symphonic foundation whose repertoire is not focused on 
staged operas but on concert opera and symphonic productions.  
Information about opera houses’ funding sources, casts and programming decisions was 
collected manually from specialist yearly magazines (Annuari EDT/CIDIM dell’Opera Lirica in 
Italia), widely regarded as industry references. Each issue provides artistic and economic 
information about the operas performed by Italian opera houses. Each opera is documented 
by means of various qualitative and quantitative data such as titles, composers, number of 
reruns and cast.  
We constructed a panel data set containing information on opera institutions from the 
2004-2005 artistic season to the 2010-2011 artistic season. As most of the time Italian opera 
houses’ artistic seasons do not coincide with the solar year, we have decided to adopt the 
artistic season as the reference time frame. This allows us to maintain the integrity of all the 
seasons in the database.  
Using seasonally updated data from 2004 to 2011, our final sample includes 42 
professional opera companies and festivals, which, given our lagged repertoires (discussed 
in the next section), results in 200 observations. 3 
                                                        
3 Nine observations have been dropped due to missing financial data. 
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Variables 
 
Dependent variable: 
 
 
 Hybrid reinterpretations of a category that defines organizations’ market identities (Modern 
reinterpretations of traditional operas): we measured theatres’ willingness to create hybrid 
reinterpretations of traditional operas (a category that defines opera houses’ market 
identities) as the percentage of theatres’ new productions that confers a modern visual 
dimension (set design, stage directions..) to traditional pre-20th century operas (e.g., Peter 
Sellar’s 1990 staging of Mozart’s Don Giovanni as a New York City drug dealer).  
Audiences’ attention rate (opera houses’ occupancy rate). The occupancy rate is measured as 
the average occupancy per opera season. This indicator allows to evaluate the ability of each 
theatre to fill out its capacity by selling tickets and subscriptions (Agid & Tarondeau, 2008; 
Cori, 2004; Radbourne, 1998). To measure opera houses’ occupancy we initially computed 
the average attendance per opera (average number of tickets sold per opera over the year t). 
Then we measured the occupancy per opera, dividing the average attendance per opera by 
the opera house number of seats (opera house capacity). Finally we obtained the opera 
house occupancy summing each opera occupancy in year t and dividing it by the total 
number of operas offered by the theatre in year t.  
Independent variables:  
Degree of unconventionality of the features selected from a category that defines organizations’ 
market identities (Unconventionality of traditional operas). We measured this variable as the 
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inverse of the conformity index (Di Maggio and Stenberg, 1985; Jensen and Kim, 2013; Kim 
and Jensen, 2011; Pierce, 2000), which is calculated as the average number of times the 
traditional opera titles programmed by a given theatre are also programmed by the other 
theatres in the sample. The unconventionality of traditional repertoires captures the extent to 
which opera houses program unpopular, unfamiliar traditional titles instead of focusing 
their attention to over-performed traditional operas. The lower the index, the higher the 
theatre’s propensity to include in their program the most conventional traditional titles 
(Jensen and Kim, 2013; Martorella, 1977, p.358). As operatic seasons are programmed two or 
three years in advance, to measure the conventionality of the traditional operas programmed 
by a theatre over a given artistic season we first counted the number of times each opera in 
that season was produced by all the opera companies in our population over the last two 
artistic seasons (prior to the current one). We then calculated the average conventionality of 
these operas. The first season in our statistical analysis is 2006-2007 (conventionality based 
on the 2004–2005 and 2005-2007 artistic seasons) and the last one is 2010-2011 
(conventionality based on the 2008-2009 and 2009–2010 artistic seasons). 
 
We then computed the percentage of hybrid reinterpretation of a legitimate category that defines 
their identity whose features are more unconventional compared with those distinguishing the 
original interpretation of that category.  In our empirical context this variable is related to  theatres’ 
willingness to offer modern reinterpretations of traditional operas with a higher degree of 
unconventionality than purist traditional operas. First we counted the total number of modern 
reinterpretations of traditional operas whose titles have a higher unconventionality than 
those identifying purist traditional operas  (traditional, pre-20th century operas that have not 
been subjected to a modern reinterpretation). We then divided it by the total number of 
productions put on stage by a theatre over a given artistic season.  
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Network Closure: we identify an opera house’s network from the opera house’s sharing of 
artists (e.g., conductors and directors) with other opera houses. That is, a tie between opera 
house i and opera house j exists when opera house i shares artists with opera house j. We 
relied on Burt’s constraint measure of structural holes (2004) to account for the effect of 
network closure on the performance of modern reinterpretations of  traditional operas. This 
measure is defined as follows: 
 
 
  
where  𝑝𝑖𝑖′  denotes the proportion of i’s network that is invested in the relation with 𝑖
′ , 𝑝𝑞𝑖′ 
indicates the proportion of q’s network that is invested in its relation with 𝑖′.  Hi can range 
from 0 to 1. As i is connected to an infinite number of others who are themselves 
disconnected, Hi approaches 0. Conversely, if i shares artists with few opera houses that are 
well connected among themselves (e.g., they constitue a clique and share the same artists),  
then Hi will approach 1. 
 
Control Variables: 
Relational measure of status. Theatres’ status hierarchy derives from patterns of artists 
exchange relationships. To assess the status of opera house i we constructed a relational 
matrix R where each cell Rij denotes the number of times that the artists hired by the opera 
house i are also hired by the opera house j. R is a symmetric n x n matrix where n denotes 
the number of times that the artists employed by the opera house i perform at opera house j.  
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Having constructed the matrix, we then calculated status scores based on Bonacich’s (1987) 
centrality measure, a standard measure for relational data on status, to determine each 
organization’s status relative to that of other organizations. The measure is defined as 
follows:  
 
 
where,  is an arbitrary scaling coefficient, B is a weighting parameter, 1 is a column 
vector where each element has the value “1,” and St is also a column vector where element 
Si,t indicates the status of opera house i. Status scores are standardized so that the highest 
status opera house in a given year has a status of 1. The upper bound on B is the reciprocal 
of the largest eigenvalue of the R matrix. For the analyses that follow, we set B at this upper 
bound. Given this specification, an opera house’s status is a function of the number of opera 
houses that hire the same artists and of the status of these opera houses (which in turn 
derives from the number and the status of opera houses with whom they share artists and so 
on).  
Since an opera house’s artistic season in the time period t is programmed over the 
previous two artistic seasons, we believed it was more appropriate to include  the status of 
an opera house as a lagged variable t-2 . This allows us to measure the status of an opera 
house at the time in which the programming decisions for a given artistic season were 
actually made. 
Opera houses’ funding sources. Opera houses’ funding sources may exert a strong influence 
on opera houses programming decisions (Martorella, 1977; Di Maggio and Stenberg, 1985). 
We controlled for opera houses’ funding sources by computing the share of total revenues 
accounted for by national government grants, private funds and box office revenues.  
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Time dummies. We also included dummies for each artistic season in the model.  
Size. We used the total number of programmed runs to control for an opera house’s size. We 
measure this as the number of performance runs an opera house set up in the artistic season 
t. 
Coproduction of modern reinterpretations of traditional operas (coproduced-hybrids). 
Coproducing operas with other theatres can lower the perception of risk related to hybrid 
strategies which in turn may affect theatres’ propensity to undertake them. We measured 
theatres’ propensity to coproduce hybrid operas with other theatres by dividing the number 
of coproduced modern reinterpretations of traditional operas by the total number of operas 
programmed in a given opera season.  
Competition: We defined competitive pressures by the extent to which opera companies 
are located near other opera companies that offer operas in a season (within-category 
competitive pressures). Specifically, assuming that opera companies exert less competitive 
pressure on each other the farther away they are from each other and the fewer operas they 
offer, we measured competitive pressures by the repertoire-size weighted proximity of the 
focal opera companyi to all the other opera companies in the population: 
 
where Rj is the size (number of operas) of the repertoire of opera companyj, n is the number 
of opera companies, dij is the distance from opera companyi to opera companyj, and i ≠ j.   
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix are presented in Table I. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table I around here 
------------------------------------ 
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RESULTS: 
Table II presents the fixed-effects ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results (a 
Hausman test indicated that the fixed-effect model was more appropriate than random-
effects) (Stock and Watson, 2007). All the variables have been standardized in order to guard 
against multicollinearity (Aiken, West and Raymon, 1991).  
 
 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table II around here 
------------------------------------ 
 
In models 1 and 2 (Table II) we tested hypothesis 1 which states that organizations’ 
willingness to emphasize the unconventional features of a legitimate category that defines 
their identity (unconventionality of traditional operas in our empirical context) positively 
affects their ability to reinterpret that category through a rival one (e.g., modern 
reinterpretations of traditional operas).  Model 1 in Table II is a baseline model that contains 
only the control variables. In Model 2 (Table II) we added our independent variable.  Model 
2 provides strong support to our hypothesis 1 as there is a positive and significant 
relationship between the unconventionality of the features selected from a legitimate 
category that defines organizations’ identities and their willingness to reinterpret it through 
a rival category (β =  0.275, p < 0.01). This provides strong support to our hypothesis 1. 
In models 3, 4 and 5 (Table II) we tested hypothesis 2. In hypothesis 2 we posited that 
organizations’ ability to attract audience attention (e.g., opera houses’ occupancy rate) is 
positively affected by their willingness to increase the offer of hybrid reinterpretations of a 
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legitimate category that defines their identity whose features are more unconventional 
compared with those distinguishing its purist interpretation (e.g., modern reinterpretations 
of traditional operas whose titles are more unconventional that those identifying their purist 
interpretations). Model 3 includes only the control variables. In model 4 we added the 
percentage of hybrid reinterpretations of a legitimate category identified by unconventional 
features as an independent variable. Results from this model supports our hypothesis 2: 
there is a positive and significant relationship between the percentage of hybrid 
reinterpretations of a legitimate category whose features are more unconventional than 
those characterizing purist interpretations of the same category and organizations’ ability to 
attract audiences’ attention, measured as opera houses’ occupancy rate (β =  0.167, p < 0.05). 
Finally, in model 5 (Table II), we tested whether the previously defined relationship is 
positively moderated by organizations’ positioning within closed networks or relationships 
(hypothesis 3). As one can see the moderating effect of the degree of organizations’ networks 
closure is positive and significant (β = 0.352, p < 0.01), thereby supporting our hypothesis 3.  
As organizations’ hybrid strategies and their ability to attract audience attention may be 
path dependent on their willingness to pursue hybridity in the past and on their previous 
ability to catch audiences’ attention, we decided to control for these factors by including 
these variables as lags in our models. To avoid autocorrelation we re-estimated all the 
models by using the Arellano Bond GMM Estimator. The estimated coefficients of the 
dynamic models are presented in Table III.  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table III around here 
------------------------------------ 
 
The baseline specifications (Model 7 and Model 9) are designed to catch the effects of the 
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control variables respectively on organizations’ willingness to pursue hybridity by 
contaminating the codes of a dominant category with divergent ones and organizations’ 
ability to attract audiences’ attention (measured in our empirical context as opera houses’ 
occupancy rate). In Models 8, 10 and 11 we tested our hypotheses 1, 2 and 3. 
As a first step to assess the validity of the five dynamic specifications (from model 7 to 
model 11) we compute for each of them the statistics of the Sargan tests. All of them are 
insignificant, indicating that all our over-identifying restrictions are valid. Moreover, for 
each of the five dynamic specifications (from model 7 to model 11) we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation at any conventional significance level. We therefore 
conclude that the GMM method is appropriate for our models (Table IV). 
 
   ------------------------------------ 
Insert Table IV around here 
------------------------------------ 
Model 8 provides a further confirmation of our hypothesis 1 which is significant even 
when tested through a dynamic panel data model (β = 0.346, p < 0.01). Whereas model 9 
does not confirmed our hypothesis 2, model 11 provides strong support to hypothesis 3 (β = 
0.263, p < 0.01) (Table III).  
 
CONCLUSIONS: 
Our objective in this article was to understand how organizations can strategically 
emphasize elements that, although belonging to a legitimate category that defines their 
identity, exhibit different gradient of conformity to the exemplar of that category as a way of 
offsetting the penalties of category spanning and enabling the adoption of this practice. We 
focus on a particular form of spanning consisting in the reinterpretation of a legitimate 
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category that defines organizations’ identity through the codes of a rival category. We 
explore this relationship within the context of the Italian opera scene, where the need for 
opera houses to distinguish themselves while at the same time facing the tension between 
conservative vs. innovation-oriented logics push them to contaminate the codes of 
traditional repertoires with the visual elements of modernity.  
We reported evidence that opera houses are more willing to offer operas that reinterpret 
the taken for granted features of tradition through the visual codes of modernity when they 
select operas that are unconventional because less representative of tradition (e.g., 
unconventional opera titles of the pre-20th century tradition). In a second set of analysis we 
demonstrated that opera houses can raise the attention of the external audience by 
increasing their offering of hybrid reinterpretations of traditional operas more 
unconventional compared with those distinguishing purist versions of traditional operas 
offered over the same artistic season. This especially holds true when opera houses position 
themselves in a closed social network of relationships (e.g., Circuiti Teatrali) which facilitates 
reciprocity (Coleman, 1985) and the adoption of cooperative behaviors (Granovetter, 1985) 
aimed at promoting innovative efforts and raise audiences’ attention around them.  
Our results suggest that organizations can leverage the selection of features that are 
differentially emblematic of a category to mitigate the penalties of merging antagonist 
product categories. At the same time, we also suggest that audiences’ attention can be raised 
through the offer of hybrid products whose features are more unconventional compared 
with those identifying purist ones. This helps creating a perceptual detachment between 
rival interpretations of the same category which protects hybrids from being perceived as 
inauthentic. This strategy may in fact enable organizations to gain the benefit of 
differentiation that stems from hybridity (Hsu, Negro and Perretti, 2012) while avoiding its 
penalties by highlighting the innovativeness of hybrids, reducing the risks for them to be 
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perceived as blurred emulations of existing models. Organizations’ positioning inside a 
closed network of relationship supports organizations efforts to promote hybrid products 
that are externally perceived as innovative which in turn contributes at raising external 
attention around them.  
This study advances research on multiple category membership in markets (Durand and 
Paolella, 2012; Vergne and Wry, 2014; Kovacs and Hannan, 2014; Lounsbury and Wry, 2013; 
Lounsbury and Wry, 2014; Negro, Hannan and Rao, 2011). Specifically, we contribute to 
expand the strategic perspective on category studies shedding light on how firms can act 
strategically to alter perceptions about boundary spanning products and draw external 
attention to them. In doing so, we depart from previous studies examining how firms can 
signal affiliations with a legitimate category through the strategic use of names or other 
symbols (Zhao, Ishihara and Lounsbury, 2013). We instead highlight how firms can 
strategically modify their position within a category to mitigate the negative effects of this 
practice. Drawing on a recent theorization of unconventionality, we shift focus from 
considering unconventionality as an outcome of specific social and strategic determinants to 
the exploration of how unconventionality can be leveraged within a category to mitigate the 
negative consequences of spanning. We also highlight the importance of considering the 
other category features of a product (rather than just its multiple membership) to assess its 
ability to gather the external audiences’ attention. Indeed, a hybrid product may be 
perceived very differently depending on the degree of conventionality of its internal 
features. By shedding light on how the degree of conventionality of a category that defines 
organizations’ identity affects their ability to reinterpret them through a rival category, we 
also emphasize the idea that identities may exhibit differences that are individuated within a 
particular category (Navis and Glynn, 2011) which in turn may affect organizations’ ability 
to transform their identities through hybrids.  
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Our analysis also contributes to the discussion about audiences’ reactions to different 
forms of spanning (Vergne and Wry, 2014),  suggesting that unconventional feature can be 
used by firms to disguise a potential liability, namely the risk of inauthenticity that arises 
when the organizations alter the codes of a category that defines their identities through 
rival ones. In this scenario, positive reactions to this particular form of spanning will be 
contingent on organizations’ ability to signal the perceptual detachment between between 
hybrid and purist interpretations of the same product features, thus safeguarding products 
that do not conform to the conventions of an existing genre or category from the risk of 
being perceived as inauthentic.  
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Table I. Descriptive Statistics and correlation matrix 
Significance: 
†p < .10. 
 
 
 
  
Variable 
 
 
Mean 
 
SD 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
12 
 
13 
 
1 Modern reinterpretation s 
of traditional operas 
(hybrids) 
0.168 
 
2.111 
 
 
1 
          
  
 
2 
Unconventionality of 
traditional operas 
-27.22 
 
14.98 
 
 
0.348† 
 
1 
 
 
  
 
 
 
     
  
 
3 
Modern reinterpretations 
of unconventional 
features  
 
0.068 
 
0.121 
 
0.449† 
 
0.787 
 
1 
 
 
       
  
 
4 
Audience attraction 
0.700 0.241 0.176† 0.104 0.179† 1        
  
 
5 
 
Network closure 
 
0.286 
 
0.134 
 
-0.064 
 
-0.218† 
 
-0.084† 
 
 
0.044 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
    
  
6 
Relational status 
   0.416 0.275 -0.015† 0.054 0.020 -0.031 -0.521† 1      
  
 
7 
 
Private funding 
 
0.091 
 
0.085 
 
-0.053 
 
0.053 
 
-0.004 
 
 
-0.045 
 
0.034 
 
0.067 
 
1 
 
 
 
   
  
 
8 
Box office 
0.151 0.126 -0.155† -0.283† -0.044 -0.007 0.128† -0.025 0.001 1    
  
 
9 
State funding 
0.347 0.177 0.124† 0.011 0.020 0.136† -0.187† -0.157† -0.286† -0.127† 1   
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10 
Local funding 
0.326 0.179 0.026 0.105 0.075 -0.073 0.170† -0.281† -0.198† -0.496† -0.490† 1  
  
 
11 
Coproduction hybrid 
0.148 0.199 
-0.260† 
 
0.138† -0.214† -0.052 -0.168† 0.248† -0.022 0.025 -0.207† -0.017 1 
  
 
12 
Repertoire size 
5.799 2.846 -0.045 0.087 0.215 0.088 -0.279† 0.458† 0.055 -0.000 0.345† -0.243† -0.129† 
 
1 
 
 
13 
Competitive pressures 
0.039 0.035 -0.161† -0.053 -0.138† -0.097 -0.143† 0.203† 0.227† 0.212† -0.333† -0.251† 0.375† 
 
-0.099 
 
1 
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Table II. Model Estimation. Static panel data  
Fixed Effect Regression 
 
 
 Dependent var:                             Dep var: audiences’ attention rate           
modern reinterpretations of  
traditional operas  
(hybrids) 
  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Unconventionality of traditional 
operas 
- 0.275** 
(2.66) 
-   - 
 
- 
Modern reinterpretations of 
unconventional features 
- - - 0.167* 
(2.05) 
0.184* 
(2.33) 
Modern reinterpretations of 
unconventional features* network 
closure 
- - - -  0.352** 
(3.07) 
Network closure -0.105 
(0.47) 
-0.055 
(-0.26) 
0.180 
(0.72) 
0.171 
(0.69) 
0.109 
(0.43) 
Status -0.003 
(-0.003) 
0.011 
(0.09) 
-0.137 
(-0.93) 
      -0.127 
(-0.87) 
-0.221 
(-1.53) 
State funding -0.225 
(-0.99) 
-0.213 
(-0.96) 
-0.142 
(-0.54) 
-0.130 
(-0.50) 
-0.185 
(-0.73) 
Private funding 0.061 
 (0.39) 
0.067 
(0.44) 
0.063 
(0.28) 
0.114 
(0.51) 
0.062 
(0.29) 
Local funding -0.027 
 (-0.10) 
0.019 
  (0.07) 
-0.143 
(-0.44) 
      -0.192 
(-0.59) 
-0.193 
(-0.61) 
Box office -0.196 
(-0.93) 
-0.094 
(0.44) 
-0.079 
(-0.35) 
-0.050 
(-0.22) 
-0.034 
(-0.16) 
Size 0.104 
  (0.68) 
0.041 
(0.28) 
-0.209 
(-1.28) 
-0.236 
(-1.46) 
-0.229 
(-1.46) 
 
Hybrid coproduction -0.192 † 
(-1.91) 
-0.224* 
(-2.26) 
-0.034 
( -0.32) 
-0.012 
(-0.11) 
-0.026 
(-0.25) 
Competitive pressures 0.150 
(0.47) 
0.097 
(0.31) 
0.028 
(0.07) 
0.051 
(0.12) 
0.153 
(0.38) 
Time dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant 0.251 
(0.46) 
0.103 
(1.16) 
0.133 
(1.22) 
-0.821 
(-1.34) 
-0.728 
(-1.23) 
No. of observations 196 201 201 173 173 
Adj R-sq 0.21 0.25 0.17 0.19 0.24 
F 2.00*** 2.18*** 1.70** 1.79*** 2.06*** 
 
 
 
 
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; †p < .10; t-statistic in parenthesis 
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Table III. Arellano Bond linear dynamic  
panel data estimation (two step results)  
 
 
 
 Dep var:                                       Dep  var: audiences’ attention  rate     
modern reinterpretations of  
traditional operas (hybrids)  
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Unconventionality of traditional 
operas 
- 0.346** 
(2.86) 
-   - 
 
- 
Audiences’ attention rate (occupancy 
t-1)  
 - 0.035 
(0.20) 
0.050 
(0.28) 
-0.014 
(-0.08) 
Modern reinterpretations of a 
dominant category t-1 
0.242 
(1.70) 
0.307* 
(2.34) 
   
Modern reinterpretations of 
unconventional features 
- - - -0.108 
(-1.01) 
-0.032 
(-0.31) 
Hybrid reinterpretations of 
unconventional features* network 
closure 
- - -   0.263** 
(3.02) 
Network closure  -0.073 
(-0.47) 
0.116 
(-0.69) 
-0.162 
(-0.69) 
-0.218 
(-0.92) 
-0.164 
(-0.54) 
Status 0.238† 
(1.74) 
0.230 † 
(1.86) 
-0.191 
(-1.18) 
      -0.192 
(-1.22) 
-0.190 
(-1.18) 
State Funding -0.177† 
(-1.81) 
-0.102 
(-1.10) 
-0.367† 
(-1.70) 
-0.354 
(-1.62) 
-0.409 † 
(-1.83) 
Private Funding 0.061 
 (0.39) 
-0.041 
(-0.50) 
0.153 
(0.39) 
0.161 
(0.41) 
0.111 
(0.29) 
Local Funding 0.554* 
 (1.97) 
0.789** 
  (3.12) 
-0.094 
(-0.43) 
      0.032 
(0.14) 
-0.101 
(-0.46) 
Box Office -0.196† 
(-0.93) 
-0.039 
(0.34) 
-0.543** 
(-3.43) 
-0.543** 
(-3.37) 
-0.556** 
(-0.34) 
Size -0.108 
  (-0.68) 
-0.153 
(-1.14) 
-0.704*** 
(-4.35) 
-0.709*** 
(-4.34) 
-0.674*** 
(-4.28) 
 
Hybrid Coproduction -0.192† 
(-1.91) 
-0.342* 
(-2.20) 
-0.209* 
( -2.04) 
-0.238* 
(-2.28) 
-0.200* 
(-0.20) 
Competitive Pressures -0.052 
(-0.17) 
-0.073 
(-0.23) 
0.204 
(0.76) 
0.230 
(0.90) 
0.194 
(0.78) 
Time dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant 0.251 
(0.46) 
0.103 
(1.16) 
0.034 
(0.16) 
0.022 
(0.10) 
0.042 
(0.18) 
No. of observations 115 115 98 98 98 
Degrees of freedom 10 11 10 11 12 
𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑑𝒳2  38.75*** 50.91*** 92.98*** 102.94*** 50.91*** 
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; †p < .10; t-statistic in parenthesis 
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***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; †p < .10; t-statistic in parenthesis 
 
 
 
Table IV. Sargan Test for overidentifying restrictions and  
Arellano and Bond m2 test for autocorrelation 
 
 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Sargan Test 5.378 
(0.25) 
4.538 
(0.33) 
4.265 
(0.37) 
3.937 
(0.41) 
4.678 
(0.321) 
Second order autocorrelation 
(m2) 
-0.913 
(0.36) 
-0.630 
(0.52) 
0.803 
(0.42) 
0.920 
(0.35) 
-0.130 
(0.89) 
Notes: p-values in parentheses ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; †p < .10. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Despite the surging number of new music compositions by living composers, opera 
houses are often reluctant to include modern and contemporary operas in their programs 
(Copland, 1963; Heilbrun, 2001; Burkholder, 2000; Turrini et al., 2008). Opera companies 
worldwide are assorting their programs choosing among a small set of popular 18th and 19th 
century operas with no commitment to 20th century operas (Towse, 2003; Boerner, 2004). As 
a result, the programs of different opera houses increasingly resemble one another (Hoegl, 
1995; Pierce, 2000; Heilbrun, 2001; Dowd et al., 2002; Boerner, 2004). The masterpieces of 
Verdi, Puccini and Bizet  build the backbone of opera houses’ artistic programs while operas 
written by 20th century composers are only sporadically included in the repertoires (Opera 
Europa, 2011).  
As 20th century operas depart significantly from the traditional pre-20th century 
masterpieces that please the taste of a wide audience, programming them in the season is 
highly risky (Hoegl, 1995; Pierce, 2000; Heilbrun, 2001; Dowd et al., 2002; Boerner, 2004; 
Jensen & Kim, 2013). Nevertheless, the scarce commitment of opera managers toward 
modern and contemporary repertoires (Turrini et al., 2008; Poisson De Haro & Normandin, 
2009) is anomalous. First of all, opera houses are generally tax-exempt, government-funded 
organizations and they have an obligation to society to design their programs not only on 
the basis of the audience’s actual tastes (i.e., the box office), but also on the basis of what 
experts regard as ‘good’ or ‘necessary’ for cultivating audience tastes, for future generations 
of spectators and for the development of the opera field itself (Stigler & Becker, 1977; Cornes 
& Sandler, 1986). In addition, as shown by previous studies on the attractiveness of 
programming in the performing arts, different audience segments often have divergent 
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tastes (Urrutiaguer, 2004; Jensen & Kim; 2013): critics, experts and more adventurous opera 
lovers, for example, increasingly complain the lack of audacity and originality of opera 
houses in their artistic choices (Heilbrun, 2001; Jensen & Kim, 2013). This risk aversion and 
the choice to please the audience taste for opera warhorses might also prevent opera houses 
from broadening their audience base by attracting heterogeneous audience segments.  
Literature has not thoroughly investigated on this phenomenon: the resilience to innovate 
programs has been linked to the various drivers explaining programming strategies such as 
the socio-economic traits of the territory where organizations are located (i.e., wealth and 
education levels of the population). A less-researched antecedent of artistic renewal in this 
field is the openness to risk of the local community where opera houses are located. Whereas 
studies have shed light on a local community opennes to risk as a breeding ground for the 
emergence of experimental undertakings (Ylinenpaa, 2009; Carree & Thurik, 2010; Walcott, 
2002), no study, so far, has examined whether and how opera houses located in these 
communities will have more incentives to challenge conservative audience tastes.  
Some economic and institutional antecedents such as the amount of private or public 
funding available to theatres have also been highlighted as important determinants of opera 
houses’ programming strategies (Krebs & Pommerehne, 1995; Pierce, 2000; Assassi, 2007). By 
deciding the amount of public funding to performing arts organizations and even the 
criteria for the allocation of these public resources, politicians at the national and local 
government levels deeply affect performing arts organizations’ decisions (Krebs & 
Pommerehne, 1995; Pierce, 2000). Current research efforts, however, have neglected to 
examine how changes in the local political coalition in power affect opera houses’ 
programming decisions. Indeed, political forces often are also represented inside performing 
arts organizations and the rise of a different political coalition with new agenda and policy 
priorities might also strongly influence opera houses managers decision to renew their 
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artistic programs. Examining whether political change vs. stability affects opera repertoires 
provides a more nuanced, fine-grained explanation for the role of politics in opera 
programming.  
In this study, we fill these gaps by adopting a more extensive approach and framework. 
We analyze how and when the economic and political conditions that shape the external 
context where an opera house operates affect opera managers’ willingness to include 20th 
century works in the repertoire. Specifically, we examine the extent to which modern and 
contemporary opera programming varies in response to the interaction between economic 
pressures, local entrepreneurial values (i.e.: openness to risk) and political change. By 
focusing on modern and contemporary programs we distance our research from studies 
centered around the antecedents of the generic unconventionality of opera repertoires (Di 
Maggio & Stenberg, 1985; Pierce, 2000). On the contrary, we definitively draw on previous 
studies in the arts management literature which see strategic programming in the theatrical 
field as shaped by the trade-off between avant-garde shows and the classics (Bennett & 
Kottasz, 2001; Assassi, 2007).   
Our theoretical and empirical interest in modern and contemporary music aims at 
enhancing the understanding of what drives the programming of a specific category in the 
repertoire which varies dramatically the level of opera unconventionality (Jensen & Kim, 
2013). Indeed, modern and contemporary operas violate the widely recognized codes that 
define what to expect from the operatic genre in a number of different ways (e.g., reliance on 
atonal and dissonant systems of music expressions, aesthetics of difficulty and non-beauty, 
intent to scandalize the audience), while opening up new horizons for the development of 
the field (Lindenberger, 2007). We therefore shed more light on the contextual conditions 
that may encourage opera houses’ managers to sustain artistic innovation in the opera field. 
We begin by theorizing why the economic and political factors that shape the context where 
85  
theatres’ managers operate affect their decisions to put 20th century operas on stage. We then 
test our hypotheses by using panel data regression analysis on a sample of 30 opera houses 
in Italy over five years. Finally, we present and discuss our findings and their implications 
for research and practice. 
 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Decisions regarding the assortment of operas or music to program in the season are 
ultimately in the hands of the opera house’s artistic director (DiMaggio & Stenberg, 1985; 
Peterson, 1986; Alexander, 1996). However, programming decisions are also influenced by 
different factors such as the global private demand, the level and type of public funding, 
some traits of the community where the theatre operates like the openness to risk and 
innovation   (Turrini et al., 2008, Castaner & Campos, 2002; Towse, 2001; Turrini, 2006).  
 
The global private demand  
 
Most empirical studies on opera programming have addressed a fundamental issue in 
performing arts, namely the extent to which audience tastes influence theaters’ willingness 
to offer unconventional repertoires. The increased reliance on audience tastes and box office 
revenues have led so far to a standardization of opera programming choices (Martorella, 
1977; Heilbrun, 2001; Poisson de Haro & Normandin, 2009). This phenomenon might be 
connected to the continual upward pressure on costs that performing arts organizations 
experience (Baumol and Bowen, 1966): also opera houses are pushed to compensate for 
higher costs by excluding undesired atonal operas (like those composed nowadays) which 
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do not fare well at the box office even when ticket prices are low (Towse, 2003). As its taste 
patterns and cultural habits are often described as difficult to change and embedded in 
routines that strongly affect future attendance (Abbé-Decarroux, 1994; Krebs & 
Pommerehne, 1995), we might think that the pressure from the audience further constraints 
opera houses’ willingness to shift their programming strategies from traditional works to 
more adventurous modern repertoires. In other words, opera houses directors’ disposition 
toward avant-garde performances challenging the current tastes of the audience will be 
tempered when the occupancy rate or the box office is playing the tune (Krebs & 
Pommerehne, 1995; Levy-Garboua & Montmarquette, 1996; Turrini et al., 2008). On these 
bases we argue that performing arts’ managers having experienced high occupancy rates in 
the past have fewer incentives to change and favor modern and contemporary repertoires 
(DiMaggio and Stenberg, 1985).  For this reason, the following hypothesis can be formulated 
and tested: 
 
HP1:  The higher an opera house’s occupancy rate in the past, the lower the opera house’s propensity 
to modern and contemporary programming strategies in the future. 
 
 
Being part of the audience and sharing the same conservative taste, corporate or 
individual donors typically dislike contemporary music and opera (Fuchs, 1969). The 
renowned contemporary composer William Schuman lends support to this argument by 
stating that “timidity in programming concept tends to increase in direct proportion to the 
percentage of the budget which must be met by voluntary contributions” (Schuman and 
Stevens, 1979). As a matter of fact, at the end of the 1980s the Metropolitan Opera 
concentrated its programming decisions on the most popular works, canceling or 
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postponing 20th century masterpieces by Arnold Schoenberg as well as more recently 
commissioned operas. The exclusion of these new works was not due to their ‘lack of 
quality’ but to the private donors’ aversion to contemporary works (Fuchs, 1969; Schuman & 
Stevens, 1979). Literature in the field would therefore suggest that: 
 
HP2: The higher the percentage of total revenues accounted for by private grants, the lower an opera 
house’s propensity to modern and contemporary programming strategies in the future. 
 
Traditional studies on programming in the performing arts have also examined the 
influence of subscribers on performing arts organizations’ programming decisions 
(Martorella, 1977; Hobson, 1983): subscribers hamper artistic prerogatives and push opera 
houses toward more conservative repertoires and cast selections (Martorella, 1977).  
More recent audience market research has provided empirical evidence that challenges 
the view of subscribers as innovation-depressing actors (Johnson & Garbarino, 2001; 
Semenik & Young, 1979). As a matter of fact, subscribers are typically more likely to be hard-
core art enthusiasts and better connoisseurs of a given genre than non-subscribers. They also 
develop higher levels of satisfaction, more trust and stronger commitment toward art 
organizations regardless of the programming. In particular, Johnson and Garbarino (2001) 
find that the main motive prompting subscribers to attend performances is their need for 
educational enrichment (Johnson & Gambarino, 2001). On the basis of the latter arguments, 
we argue that opera houses with large subscriber bases might be more open to take the risk 
of program innovation. In fact, they rely on a particular type of ‘slack resources’ which allow 
them to make ‘unpopular’ artistic choices (Castaner & Campos, 2002). Following this line of 
reasoning, we propose the following hypothesis:  
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HP3: The higher the number of subscribers to an opera house in the past, the higher the opera house’s 
propensity to modern and contemporary programming strategies in the future. 
 
 The public funding  
 
Nowadays, the majority of opera houses would not survive without an extra market 
funding. Several empirical studies show that national government intervention has a 
substantial influence in boosting creativity and experimentation in performing arts 
organizations (Krebs and Pommerehne, 1995; Alexander, 1996; Pierce, 2000; Tajtakova, 2006; 
Agid & Tarondeau, 2007). Martorella (1977), for instance, argues that European opera houses 
are able to propose more contemporary works than their American counterparts because of 
the higher level of public funds they receive from the government. Austen - Smith (1980) 
provides further support for this argument, showing that subsidies encourage the 
preservation of more innovative plays in the English theater sector. In addition, Heilbrun 
(2001) suggests that the higher levels of diversity in operatic repertoires in Canada compared 
to the U.S. could be due to the higher level of funding the Canadian government provides 
for opera (Heilbrun, 2001). Similarly, recent empirical findings by O’Hagan and Neligan 
(2005) have demonstrated that increases in public subsidies have fostered experimentation 
in German public theaters. Following the above line of reasoning, we thus propose the 
following hypotheses:  
 
HP4:  The higher the percentage of total revenues accounted for by national grants, the higher an 
opera house’s propensity to modern and contemporary programming strategies in the future. 
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By disentangling the effect of national and local government funds on opera houses’ 
programming strategies, we argue further that an increased financial support granted by 
local policy makers to opera houses will enhance the conservative traits of their repertoires 
by reducing programmers’ willingness to select modern and contemporary operas. As noted 
by Pierce (2000), local decision makers are likely to display a preference for the popularity of 
an activity or service which they directly fund. Theatres which are more dependent on local 
funds are therefore less willing to take the risk of disregarding the preference of the 
audience and, consequently, losing the financial support of local decision makers. This view 
of local political involvement is supported by Krebs and Pommerehne (1995), whose study 
on German performing arts institutions show that politicians often constraint theatres’ 
managers programming decisions by subordinating the allocation of funds to the 
achievement of objectives such as the maximization of the venue capacity or minimum own 
revenue. We posit: 
 
HP5: The higher the percentage of total revenues accounted for by local government grants, the 
lower an opera house’s propensity to modern and contemporary programming strategies in the future. 
Politicians have often been cited as exerting a strong influence on performing arts 
organizations especially when national or local governments also financially support an 
organization (Krebs & Pommerehne, 1995). In the case of Italian opera houses this is 
especially true as Mayors serve by law as chairpersons of opera houses’ boards and as legal 
representatives of these institutions.  
We argue that when a newly elected mayor is on the opera house board as chairperson or 
legal representative of the opera house, modern and contemporary repertoires will be more 
prominent in artistic directors’ programming strategies. At least two rationales support this 
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argument. First, newly elected local leaders may bring with them electoral coalitions with 
new agenda and policy priorities that diverge from those of their predecessors (Wolmand et 
al., 1996). Second, newly elected Mayors often strive to differentiate themselves from 
incumbent by disrupting the existing equilibrium through creative discovery (Schneider & 
Teske, 1992). In this respect, they have incentives to undertake policy change that distance 
themselves from their predecessors whom the electorate has just rejected (Wolman et al., 
1996). Political leaders’ willingness to alter established policies is therefore contingent on the 
different phases of their mandates. In the early phases, their willingness to support 
audacious policy decisions becomes more important than in the last ones. As most of them 
defeated the incumbents and their rivals by making promises of social and economic change 
(Aragones et al., 2007), at the beginning of their mandate they face the compelling need to 
signal their credible commitment to the social development of the local community.  
However, as time goes by, politicians become more interested in raising consensus and 
popularity in order to increase the chances of being re-elected (Krebs & Pommerehne, 1995) 
or simply to nurture their ambitions to further advance their political career after the end of 
the mandate (Hain, 1974). As a result, they have more incentives to behave opportunistically 
by increasing their support for items that are more visible to the electorate (Veiga & Veiga, 
2007; Aidt, 2011). On these grounds, we argue that Mayors working for a long time on a 
territory will be more likely to reinforce current audiences’ tastes by supporting opera 
houses’ selection of traditional works. By contrast, when a political change occurs, opera 
directors have more chances to get unconventional artistic project be accepted and 
supported by the local political coalition.  We argue:  
 
HP6: The longer the current mayor’s tenure, the lower an opera house’s propensity to modern and 
contemporary programming strategies in the future. 
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The local community openness to risk 
 
Urban studies have suggested that the presence of a huge number of startup firms in a 
given area reflects specific traits of the local community, namely its openness to risk and 
uncertainty (Ylinenpaa, 2009; Carree & Thurik, 2010). A high firm birth rate is a sign of a 
local community marked by risk-taking people aspiring to innovate, motivated by non-
conformity and entrepreneurial attitudes. We expect opera houses’ artistic directors exposed 
to such an entrepreneurial environment to be more likely to pursue the high risk path of 
programming 20th century operas. We argue:  
 
HP7: The stronger the openness to risk of the local community where an opera house is located, the 
higher the opera house’s propensity to modern and contemporary programming strategies in the 
future. 
 
We also argue that  when the local community where private donors live or do business is 
open to risk, private donations may increasingly prompt opera houses to program 20th 
century works. Indeed, if the business community surrounding an entrepreneur or a donor 
is progressive, reluctance towards avant-garde repertoires will decrease (Castaner and 
Campos, 2002). Under these conditions, corporate donors encourage opera houses to 
program modern and contemporary repertoires as a way to signal to their stakeholders (e.g., 
employees, customers, investors, communities) their innovative-oriented culture and their 
contribution and active participation in the development and enhancement of the opera 
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tradition. In this regard, private actors may be attracted by the possibility to signal their 
efforts to foster innovation in a highly conservative environment. Private funders’ 
commitment to modern and contemporary operas may in fact enhance their image as 
socially responsible actors who actively support the development of an artistic field which is 
resistant to change. This, in turn, would give them an opportunity of connecting their brand 
image with the ideas of creativity. Castaner and Campos (2002) clearly described this 
phenomenon:  corporations often seek to associate themselves to highly distinctive and 
elitist symbols with the final aim of increasing their visibility in the community and 
differentiating their brand image from that of other companies.  
 
Drawing on these theoretical arguments and fieldwork evidence, we therefore advance 
the following hypothesis:  
 
 
HP8: In local communities which are more open to risk, the higher the percentage of the opera house’s 
total revenues accounted for by private grants, the higher the opera house’s propensity to 
modern and contemporary programming strategies in the future. 
 
Going one step further, we argue that constraints to the modernization of opera 
repertoires are also contingent on the extent to which the audience is risk-avert or close to 
diversity. In this respect, when the local community surrounding the theatre is shaped by 
individuals with progressive and entrepreneurial traits, theatres’ managers will have more 
incentives to open up the repertoire to operas that challenge conservative tastes. In this 
scenario, instead of focusing on “what satisfies audiences’ tastes”, artistic directors might 
dare to open new artistic horizons, acting as facilitators for the emergence of new tastes. 
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Theatres’ managers might expect the audience which is part of an open-to-risk community 
to accept the risk of failing to understand performances that disrupt the safe course of 
existing conventions. This, in turn, might lower the perception of uncertainty connected with 
the programming of modern and contemporary repertoires, making programmers feel less 
constrained by the risk of incurring in negative audience reactions. As noted by Payne, 
(2005; 318) “there is a tension between the perceived safe course of following the herd and 
the risk of striking an individual line”. Under these contextual conditions, we argue, opera 
houses’ artistic directors will be motivated rather than discouraged by their audience to 
increase the proportion of 20th century operas in their repertoires.  
Drawing on these theoretical arguments and fieldwork evidence, we therefore advance 
the following hypothesis:  
 
HP9: In local communities which are more open to risk, the higher the opera house’s occupancy rate 
in the past, the higher the opera house’s propensity to modern and contemporary programming 
strategies in the future.  
 
Figure 1. Conceptual frameworks and hypotheses 
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DATA AND METHODS 
 Sample  
 
We tested the hypotheses in the Italian opera sector from 2006 to 2010. We selected only 
those opera houses that had data available for the period in question, and we constructed a 
panel data set containing information on 30 opera houses observed over time. Nowadays 
opera houses in Italy compose a highly fragmented sector. Our sample includes data on the 
most important Italian opera institutions which are Lyric Symphonic Foundations (LSFs) 
and Teatri di Tradizione (TDTs). LSFs, well known for their prestigious traditions, are 
private foundations located in the largest Italian towns. TDTs operate in medium and small 
scale cities. Both LSFs and TDTs are largely publicly funded. Data on the opera houses’ 
programming choices, funding mix, number of subscribers and governance structures was 
collected from specialist yearbooks (Annuari EDT/CIDIM dell’Opera Lirica in Italia) which are 
widely regarded as industry references. Data on the number of cultural events organized 
within a local territory each year was gathered from the Annuario dello Spettacolo published 
by SIAE (the Italian copyright agency). Data on the length of the mayor’s tenure and election 
years in the period under review (2006 to 2010) was retrieved from the Italian Ministry of the 
Interior’s database on local government elections. Finally, data on the firm birth rate was 
retrieved from the Chamber of Commerce, and data on the number of inhabitants per Italian 
city was gathered from demo Istat, the Italian national institute of statistics. 
 
Measures 
 
To test our hypotheses, we used the following measures: 
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Dependent variable: 
 
Propensity to modern and contemporary programming strategies 
It measures a theatre’s propensity to program 20th century works given its annual amount 
of financial resources. It is calculated dividing the total number of modern and 
contemporary performance runs by the natural logarithm of the theatre’s annual income. As 
suggested by Moir and Taffler (2004) it is not considered a theatre’s main goal to increase its 
revenues but to create values and be accountable for various stakeholders, especially the 
audiences and society. In this regard, opera houses’ propensity to reinvest their income 
toward modern and contemporary programs should be considered as a proxy of their ability 
to accomplish their mission, by contributing to the artistic advancement of the classic music 
field and to the social development of their local community. The use of the natural 
logarithm is appropriate in this case because of the large variance of the variable.  
Most of existing studies used the conventionality index as a dependent variable in the 
programmatic models. However, recent studies highlight the importance of moving beyond 
evaluating the conventionality of art institutions merely with reference to the average 
conventionality of the entire repertoires. Instead, it is important to distinguish between the 
different components of the repertoire because they can vary a lot in their degree of 
conventionality (Jensen & Kim, 2013). Following Heilbrun (2001) and Jensen & Kim (2013), 
we defined unconventionality as a rupture with consolidated music canons and a shift from 
traditional to modern and contemporary repertoires (Martorella, 1977; Heilbrun & Gray, 
1993; Jensen & Kim, 2013). These repertoires include works by composers whose date of 
birth is 1881 or later. These composers had therefore developed their adult operatic style in 
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the 20th century (Heilbrun, 2001, Kim and Jensen, 2011). Examples of these composers are 
Berg, Stravinsky, Korngold, Weill, Glass and Adams.  
 
 
 
Independent variables: 
 
Since an opera house’s artistic program for year t is decided in the year before it opens (t-
1), we believed it was more appropriate to test the effect of certain variables measured in 
year t-1, including them in the model as lagged variables. Although opera houses’ cast 
selection may start from three to five years in advanced, the programming decisions are 
settled and promoted the year before the start of the operatic season. Moreover, over the last 
years the increased volatility and reduction in government funds assigned to Italian opera 
houses are hampering their ability to develop artistic programs on a long term basis. In this 
scenario, programming decisions regarding the assortment of the opera in the repertoire are 
often taken along the year that precedes the opening of the artistic season. In sum, we 
postulated that in year t-1 the artistic director decides on the opera mix for year t on the 
basis of the information available in year t-1. By lagging some of the independent variables 
we also avoided variable endogeneity. Other variables were measured in year t as these 
factors can be foreseen at t-1: this occurs in particular when programming and funding 
processes are not synchronized like for opera houses, which typically program and commit 
resources before effectively receiving public contributions for their artistic programs.  
 
Occupancy rate in year t-1. This variable is measured as the average occupancy per opera 
season and allows us to evaluate the ability of each theater to fill out its capacity by selling 
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tickets (Cori, 2004). In order to measure the opera house’s occupancy rate, we initially 
computed the average attendance per opera (average number of tickets sold per opera over 
the year t-1). We then measured occupancy per opera, dividing the average attendance per 
opera by the number of seats in the opera house (i.e., opera house capacity). Finally, we 
obtained the opera house occupancy rate by summing each opera’s occupancy rate in year t-
1 and dividing it by the total number of operas offered by the theater in year t-1. 
 
Local community openness to risk in year t-1. We measure this variable as the number of new 
firms started up in a given territory each year compared to the total number of firms in that 
territory. 
 
Subscribers base in year t-1. We measured this variable as the total number of subscribers 
attending an opera house’s performances in year t-1. 
 
National and local government funds in year t. We measured this variable as the total amount of 
funds an opera house received from the national and local governments over year t, divided 
by the total revenues from ticket sales, public and private funds. This indicator allows us to 
measure the share of government funding in the total revenues of an opera house. 
 
Private grants in year t. We measured this indicator as the total amount of private funds 
received by an opera house over year t divided by the total revenues from ticket sales, public 
and private funds. This indicator allows us to evaluate the proportion of total revenues 
accounted for by private grants.  
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Length of a mayor’s tenure in year t-1. We captured the length of the mayor’s tenure at t-1 by 
measuring the number of years the mayor had been in charge as of year t-1.  
  
Control variables 
We used the total number of programmed runs to control for an opera house’s program size.  
 
We controlled for the size of the city where an opera house is located. The city size is 
measured as the number of the city’s inhabitants per year.  
 
We also controlled for the wealth of the local territory measured as the local gdp per capita and 
for the demand for performing arts on the local territory measured as the citizens’ monthly per 
capita expenditure for performing arts events. 
 
As managers’ longevity may have an impact on the propensity to program modern 
repertoire, we also controlled for the length of the artistic director’s tenure. 
 
We also included theatre and time dummies. 
 
Table I presents the correlation matrix and descriptive statistics. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table I around here 
----------------------------------- 
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RESULTS 
 
Table II presents the fixed-effects ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results. Model 1 
(Table II) is a baseline model that contains only the control variables length of the artistic 
director’s mandate, local demand for performing arts events, GDP per capita, city size and 
program size. In model 2 (Table II) we added occupancy rate, local community openness to 
risk, subscriber rate, national and local government funding, private funding and length of a 
mayor tenure as independent variables. In model 3 (Table 3) we computed the interaction 
between the local community openness to risk and the opera houses’ occupancy rate to test 
the moderating effect predicted in hypothesis 8. In this model we also included the 
interaction between the local community openness to risk and the proportion of private 
grants received annually by opera houses to test hypothesis 9.  
 
 
 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table II around here 
----------------------------------- 
Hypothesis 1 posits that the more an opera house depends on occupancy rate at year t-1, the 
lower its propensity to program contemporary operas in the future. As shown in model 3, 
the relationship between theaters’ occupancy rate in year t-1 and the propensity to program 
contemporary operas for year t is negative and significant (β = - 0.264; p < 0.05). Hypothesis 1 
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is therefore supported. In Hypothesis 2, we state that the higher the percentage of total 
revenues accounted for by private grants, the lower the opera houses’ willingness to stage 
contemporary opera. Since the relationship between private grants and our dependent 
variable is not significant, Hypothesis 2 is not supported. We also hypothesize that the larger 
the number of subscribers attending an opera house’s artistic season, the higher the opera 
house’s propensity to program contemporary operas (Hypothesis 3). Model 3 provides 
strong support for our argument: the relationship between subscribers and modern and 
contemporary operas is positive and significant (β = 0.926, p < 0.01).  
Hypothesis 4 suggests that the higher the percentage of total revenues accounted for by 
national grants, the higher the opera houses’ willingness to stage contemporary operas. In 
contrast, Hypothesis 5 posits that the higher the percentage of total revenues attributable to 
local government grants, the lower the opera houses’ propensity to stage contemporary 
operas. As shown in Table II, national government funds have a negative and significant 
impact on our dependent variable (national government funds: β = - 0.509, p < 0.05). The 
effect of local government funds on opera houses’ propensity to modern and contemporary 
programming strategies is negative and slightly significant (β = - 0.372, p < 0.10). Therefore, 
we cannot verify Hypothesis 4, while our analysis supports Hypothesis 5. Hypothesis 6 
considers the extent to which the local government’s political stability (i.e., length of tenure 
of the current mayor) influences modern and contemporary programming strategies. Model 
3 shows that, indeed, the longer the tenure of the mayor, the lower the opera houses’ 
propensity to program 20th century operas (β = - 0.204, p < 0.05).  
Hypothesis 7 suggests that the stronger the openness to risk of the community where an 
opera houses is located, the higher the opera house’s propensity to modern and 
contemporary programming strategies in the future. Model 3 fails to support this 
hypothesis: the relationship between the local community openness to risk and opera 
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houses’ propensity to 20th century opera programming is negative and significant (β = - 
0.323, p < 0.05). In hypothesis 8, however,  we predict that the openness to risk of the 
community where an opera house is located positively moderates the effect of an opera 
house’s past occupancy rate on its propensity to program modern and contemporary operas 
in the future. In model 3 the interaction effect between the local community openness to risk 
and opera houses’ occupancy rate is positive and significant (β = 0.278; p < 0.01), offering 
support for hypothesis 8. Hypothesis 9 posits that the openness to risk of the local 
community where an opera house is located positively moderates the effect of private 
funding on opera houses’ propensity to program modern and contemporary operas. As can 
be noted, in model 3 (Table II) the interaction effect between the local community openness 
to risk and the proportion of private grants received annually by opera houses is not 
significant. Therefore hypothesis 9 is not supported.  
            
 
CONCLUSIONS:  
In this paper, we have investigated constraints and drivers affecting the decision to 
introduce modern and contemporary operas. We have built our conceptual framework 
looking at opera houses as organizations which are subjected to different stakeholders’ 
pressures affecting their programming decision making process. We found that when opera 
houses highly rely on the audience pressure they are less inclined to stage contemporary 
operas. In this situation they fear that innovation might lead to a loss in audience consensus 
and a decrease in ticket office’s revenues compromising their economic sustainability. The 
voice of the audience temper the artistic urge toward innovation. Although this result are in 
line with background literature, our findings also suggest that this constraining effect is 
positively moderated by specific traits of the local community where the theatre is located. 
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Specifically, when theatres are immersed in dynamic entrepreneurial environments marked 
by the presence of risk-taking individuals, the market support received by a theatre in the 
past will foster rather than obstacle theatres’ managers propensity to program modern and 
contemporary operas.  
One might expect benevolent politicians to balance the negative effects of audience 
pressure by heavily subsidizing theatres, incentivizing the scheduling of modern operas. On 
the contrary, our study casts some shadows about the effectiveness of public funding: 
neither national nor local government funding stimulates the programming of modern and 
contemporary repertoires. There might be a contingent reason behind this result: national 
grants in Italy are allocated largely on the basis of production costs, which encourages opera 
houses to stage operas with large numbers of performers (singers, dancers, mimes, etc.) and 
penalizes smaller productions (which is often the case in contemporary performances). 
However as local government funding encourages program conventionality as well it seems 
that public funding magnify the pressure by the audience to favor tradition over artistic 
renewal (Pierce, 2000; Krebs & Pommerehne, 1995). In this scenario, only political turnover 
and changes in the governing coalition provide either an incentive or the opportunity for 
opera houses’ directors to engage in risk-taking behaviors and to bear the risk of ending the 
season with lower occupancy. Conversely enhanced political stability in a given territory 
prompts opera houses to exhibit more conservative behavior in their programming 
decisions: the longer a Mayor has governed the city (and chaired the board of the opera 
house), the lower the opera house’s inclination toward modernity in programming. Opera 
houses’ directors should therefore take advantage of the opportunities that spring up from 
the temporal dynamics of politics. Under conditions of political renewal theatres’ managers 
have a leeway to enhance the proactive component of their programming by affirming their 
aesthetic intuitions and artistic values. In general terms, the parallel between political 
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change/stability and artistic renewal/conservatism appears quite promising for future 
research in this field.  
The results of this study suggest also some important managerial implications for 
theatres. In fact our empirical findings show that theaters with large subscriber bases are 
also more likely to program contemporary works. In this respect, the development of 
relationship marketing instruments designed to enlarge the subscriber base may help create 
a balance between financial health and innovation objectives. As a matter of fact, subscribers 
provide a stable source of income and at the same time encourage opera houses to program 
contemporary works. 
Our findings may also be useful for policy makers in highlighting the lack of effectiveness 
of public subsidies aiming at fostering innovation. It is beyond the scope of our research to 
study if and how opera houses can counteract conservative forces through audience 
education strategies. However, we strongly believe that policies devoted to this aim might 
be better effective in driving and nurturing innovation. Future studies should examine the 
effect of different types of educational programs on audiences’ willingness to appreciate 
experimental programs and on artistic directors’ openness to risk taking programming 
decisions.  
Due to a lack of available data we were not able to incorporate the average price per 
performance as a control variable in the model. We believe future studies should take into 
account the extent to which lowering the prices of modern and contemporary operas may 
increase the demand for them, thus functioning as an incentive for opera programmers to 
shift their programming decisions toward 20th century repertoires.  
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How God and King Affect our Musical Tastes:  
Shedding Light on Religiosity, Political Convictions and Taste Cultivation  
as drivers of Eclectic vs. Voracious Music Preferences 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Sociological studies on cultural consumption have commonly defined cultural 
omnivorousness as a consumer’s openness to enjoy different forms of culture (Peterson, 
2005; Peterson and Kern, 1996; Peterson, 1997; Peterson, 1992; Warde et al., 1999). Starting 
from the seminal study of Peterson and Kern (1996) this stream of research has emphasized 
that cultural consumers, especially those from the upper social classes, have become more 
omnivorous than in the past. The interpretation of the omnivorousness theoretical construct, 
however, remains quite controversial. Two slightly different conceptions of cultural 
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omnivorousness can be identified. The first highlights the cumulative property of cultural 
consumption: the more people consume certain specific cultural goods, the more likely they 
are to become involved in other forms of cultural consumption. In this sense, cultural 
omnivorousness could be better labeled as cultural voracity (Katz-Gerro and Sullivan, 2010). 
The second conception, instead, highlights the eclectic dimension of cultural 
omnivorousness. Here, omnivorousness deals more with the variety of tastes people express 
than with the quantity of cultural goods they consume (Coulangeon, 2003). Whether focused 
on voracious or eclectic consumption patterns, studies on omnivorousness have mainly 
focused on the effect of socio-demographic factors such as age, status and education on the 
development of omnivorous cultural tastes (Van Eijck, 2001; Warde and Gayo-Cal, 2009, 
Garìa-Alvarez, Katz-Gerro and Sintas, 2007; Bryson, 1996; Ollivier, 2008). By contrast, the 
investigation of whether and how  “soft” factors such as taste cultivation, political and 
religious convictions influence omnivorousness is still largerly unexplored (North and 
Hargreaves, 2007; Roose and Vander Stichele, 2010).  
We therefore examine how taste cultivation and the strenght of an individual’s political 
interest and religious beliefs affect the formation of voracious vs. eclectic cultural tastes. 
Focusing specifically on the development of omnivorous music preferences, we explore how 
these factors influence the number of music genres individuals like (voraciousness) as well as 
the degree of diversification of their music taste (eclecticism). First, we argue that politically-
interested individuals are more propense to develop voracious music tastes: voraciousness 
enables them to express their personal self-efficacy by building an image of time-pressured 
individuals which becomes a new form of distinction based on the value of a multi-tasking 
and active lifestyle (Sullivan and Katz-Gerro, 2007). Second, we argue that individuals with 
strong religious convictions will be more open to appreciate a diversified set of music genres 
because the contacts with both highbrow and “sacred” as well as lowbrow and “profane” 
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music forms confer them new opportunities to nurture their spirituality. Third, we contend 
that while the familiar music habit of attending concerts may stimulate individuals’ appetite 
for a huge number of cultural experiences, the practice of attending music classes facilitates 
the development of an eclectic music taste by fostering individuals’ effort to broaden the 
pool of knowledge required to appreciate a variety of music genres.   
This study contributes to move the discussion on the determinants of taste voraciousness 
and eclecticism ahead by shedding better light on the profiles of voracious and eclectic 
omnivora. Previous studies show that these cultural consumers exhibit similar socio-
demographic traits such as age, education and social class (Warde and Gayo–Cal, 2009; 
Coulangeon, 2003; Van Eijck, 2000; Van Eijck et al., 2001). We add to these studies that 
religiosity, politics and taste cultivation drive the distinction between the profiles of 
voracious and eclectic omnivora. Moreover, instead of focusing on the formation of cultural 
tastes in general, our study revolves around the determinants of eclectic and voracious 
music tastes through an analysis of the music preferences of an Italian opera audience. 
Indeed, studies on the audience of classical music and opera audience are rare, and even 
those made, are rather qualitative, than empirical.  
We develop and test hypotheses drawing on a survey research method. Data were 
obtained from a survey of the opera audience profile of Maggio Musicale Fiorentino, one of the 
most famous Italian operatic institution. Our main findings show that the strength of an 
individual’s religious beliefs and political interests differentially influence voraciousness and 
eclecticism. Specifically, voracious omnivora have strong political convictions while politics 
does not seem to affect the taste of the eclectic omnivora, whose profile is instead 
characterized by deeply rooted religious convictions that result in a greater tolerance of 
diversity. This partially contradicts previous studies that associate politics with freedom to 
cross boundaries and religion with the preservation of traditional boundaries that limit an 
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individual’s self- expression (Garìa-Alvarez, Katz-Gerro and Sintas, 2007; Peterson, 2005). In 
addition, we also show that taste cultivation differentially affects the development of eclectic 
and voracious music tastes in such a way that the familiar music habit of attending concerts 
may stimulate individuals’ appreciation for a huge number of cultural experiences 
contributing to the formation of voracious taste patterns while the practice of attending 
music classes inhibits rather than facilitates the development of an eclectic taste.   
This study has implications for the management of opera houses’ artistic offer and for the 
development of their marketing strategies. Shedding light on unexplored determinants of an 
opera audience music tastes such as religiosity, political convictions and taste cultivation 
may enable opera houses’ directors and marketing professionals to develop ad hoc 
performances, educational activities and marketing strategies aimed at strengthening their 
relationships with different audience segments. As individual characteristics are at the basis 
of their propensity to be loyal to performing arts organizations, unveiling the distinctive 
individual traits of voracious and eclectic audiences may enable opera managers to 
differentiate their loyalty-building policies according to the personal characteristics of the 
attendees (Guillon, 2011). In addition, understanding which factors influence the eclecticism 
and voraciousness of their audiences’ tastes and why these music taste patterns are desirable 
may encourage opera houses to create activities that foster a dialogue between opera and 
other music forms which are rooted in different cultural traditions. This in turn may create 
forms of social inclusion which can help opera houses to broaden their audience base by 
attracting people from various social classes and cultural milieux.  
The study is structured as follows. We begin by providing a review of the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the profile of eclectic and voracious omnivora, before theorizing why 
the strenght of an individual’s political and religious beliefs as well as her taste cultivation 
shape the development of voracious and eclectic music taste patterns. We then present the 
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main findings of our study and discuss the profile of voracious vs. eclectic opera audiences 
as well as the determinants of their tastes for different music genres. We end our study by 
describing its main implications for arts management research and practice, examining 
limitations, and making suggestions for future research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OMNIVOROUSNESS AS  TASTE VORACIOUSNESS VS. ECLECTICISM 
 
Sociological research demonstrates that music taste mostly depends on an individual’s 
socio economic and demographic background. The debate which still determines this field of 
interest, is between Pierre Bourdieu’s “univore thesis” and Richard A. Peterson’s “omnivore 
thesis”. Bourdieu’s studies show that individuals at the top of the social hierarchy have 
highbrow cultural tastes, so they listen only to the most sophisticated musical genres (e.g., 
classical music and opera). On the contrary, individuals from middle - or low social strata, 
have a more popular cultural taste, so for instance, they listen to country or folk music 
(Bourdieu, 1984;1983). On these grounds people’s tastes constitute in some way the symbolic 
dimension of the ‘class struggle,’ because the sphere of taste is organized hierarchically in 
line with a ‘highbrow/lowbrow’ opposition.   
Bourdieu’s thesis has been repeatedly criticized, but the most important antithesis is that 
of Richard A. Peterson. As Peterson points out, individuals from upper social strata have 
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become more culturally omnivorous than in the past. Omnivorous cultural consumers are 
therefore open to different kind of music rather than simply limit themselves to few 
highbrow music genres (Peterson, 1992). This hypothesis, systematized in an article by 
Richard Peterson and Peter Simkus on the musical tastes of contemporary Americans 
(Peterson and Simkus, 1992), is based on the idea that the main social distinction today is a 
matter of cultural diversity rather than one of highbrow or lowbrow taste. As a matter of 
fact, since the publication of the Peterson and Simkus article,  studies in North America and 
Europe have suggested that (Peterson and Kern, 1996; Bryson, 1996; Van Eijck, 2001; 
Coulangeon, 2003) cultural elites tend to be increasingly characterized by the scope and 
variety of their music tastes whereas the working classes tend to be rather more univorous.  
In another paper, Peterson (1996) explains the causes of this change in tastes. The 
emergence of this omnivorous taste pattern has been linked to broader societal changes 
during the second half of last century (Peterson and Kern, 1996). More particularly, it has 
been pointed out that the rapid development of the leisure industry and the booming of the 
mass media, together with the democratisation of the educational system, resulted in a 
serious decrease in impact and legitimacy of the fine arts among the post-war generations.  
Coulangeon (2003) has contributed to moving the discussion on cultural omnivorousness 
ahead, shedding light on two different conceptions of this construct. The first highlights the 
cumulative property of cultural consumption. It is a well-established fact that cultural 
consumption tends to display addictive characteristics. The more people consume certain 
specific cultural goods, the more likely they are to become involved in other forms of 
cultural consumption. Indeed, current surveys of cultural consumption show that people 
who read a lot of books also buy records and watch DVDs, etc. In this sense, cultural 
omnivorousness could be better labeled as cultural voracity (Katz-Gerro and Sullivan, 2010). 
Voraciousness has been described as a culturally active leisure style, an insatiable consumer 
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behavior and a dynamic cultural consumption (Sullivan and Katz-Gerro, 2007). The second 
conception, instead, emphasizes the taste eclecticism dimension of cultural omnivorousness. 
Here, omnivorousness deals more with the variety of tastes people express than with the 
quantity of cultural goods they consume.  
As stated by Peterson himself, omnivorousness is the shift ‘‘from intellectual snobbism, 
(.....), based on the glorification of arts and the contempt of popular entertainment, (......) to a 
cultural capital that appears increasingly as a willingness to appreciate the aesthetic of a 
wide variety of cultural forms, including not only the arts, but also a wide range of folk and 
popular forms of expression’’ (Peterson, 2004). The eclectic model also emphasizes a specific 
trait of the concept of omnivorousness which cannot only be regarded as an addictive 
phenomena but also as the ability to appreciate a variety of tastes which in turn requires a 
specific ability to overcome the cultural and aesthetic boundaries between various genres 
and various repertoires.  
Studies on voracious and eclectic cultural consumption agree in depicting both voracious 
and eclectic omnivora as young and highly educated, possessing economic, and cultural 
capital. The effect of age on the voracious and eclectic omnivorousness is well-documented 
in the literature. Studies by Schulze (1993) and Van Eijck (2000)  described younger cultural 
consumers as having a marked interests toward both high and popular of culture as he 
detected a different attitude to life amongst the younger age groups. Unlike the older age 
groups, their lifestyle is in fact highly focused on self-experience and self-development via 
their participation to a large number of distinct activities (Warde and Gayo –Cal, 2009; 
Coulangeon, 2003; Van Eijck, 2000).  
In addition, studies on the profile of cultural consumers have considered the socialization 
process that takes place at schools and family as having a dominant influence on both 
voracious and eclectic omnivorousness (Lahire, 2003; Van Eijck, 1999; Coulangeon, 2003). As 
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individuals with a higher qualification have broader social networks compared with people 
with lower education levels, they have more chances to interact with people from different 
social circles. As a result, they have access to a broad cultural knowledge that stems from the 
diversity of social ties that compose their social system of relationships (Van Eijck, 2001). A 
diversified web of relationships confers individuals a form of multi-cultural capital which in 
turn increases both the breadth and the quantity of the cultural activities they are engaged in 
(Coulangeon and Lemel, 2007). Not only education exposes individuals to a variety of 
cultural activities, it also increases an individual’s cultural tolerance, contributing to the 
formation of a cosmopolitan cultural taste (Lipset, 1960) that encourages individuals to cross 
the categorical boundaries between high and popular cultural activities. Within this 
perspective Bryson (1996) noted that education significantly decreases exclusiveness in 
musical tastes: individuals with high levels of education display more tolerant musical tastes 
compared with those with lower levels of education. 
While sociological studies on cultural consumption have mainly foused the attention on 
the effect of socio-demographic variables on the development of omnivorous cultural tastes, 
whether and how political convictions, religiosity and taste cultivation affect 
omnivorousness is still controversial. Shifting the focus from the socio demographic to the 
soft determinants of cultural omnivorousness we now examine how politics, religiosity and 
taste cultivation affect the formation of eclectic vs. voracious music preferences.  
 
How political convictions and religiosity affect the development of voracious vs. eclectic 
music tastes 
 
Music has been used throughout history to express all kind of political views such as 
democracy, anarchism and racism. Politically-interested individuals leverage their music 
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preferences as a vehicle to express their opinions. Indeed, the consumption of specific music 
genres has been mainly depicted as a way for invididuals with strong political convictions to 
express dissent, anti-establishment and rebellious attitudes or political activism. For 
example, hip-pop and rap have been created by poor urban black in the 1970s to manifest 
dissatisfaction about poor opportunities of life (Rose, 1994). Rock music and punk have often 
been described as antiestablishment and rebellious political attitudes. Eyerman and Jamison 
(1998, p.141) depicted rock music as a revolutionary quest for liberation. Jazz and folk 
challenge the mainstream culture and its ethics (Asma, 1997). Political messages are 
embedded in opera, classic music and musicals as well, as these genres embody a sense of 
civic activism. What these studies all have in common is their focus on music as a vehicle for 
politically interested individuals to promote their ideals (DeNora; 2000; Frith, 1981; North 
and Hargreaves, 1999).  
If the taste for specific music genres conveys information about an individual political 
view, the appreciation for a huge number of  music forms confers politically interested 
individuals enhanced opportunities to “brand” their image in a way that foster the 
acceptance of their ideas (Verba et al., 1997; Scammel, 2007). In this regard, individuals with 
strong political convictions have more chances of having their ideas being accepted if they 
exhibit a more active lifestyle: music preferences, like other cultural tastes become therefore 
a conduit for the expression of a positive activism that is essentially a new form of 
distinction. As well expressed by Verba et al. (1997) “to the extent that citizen activity 
provides a critical channel for the communication of citizen preferences, those who are less 
active pay a price in terms of representation. Public officials hear less about-and, therefore, 
presumably pay less attention to-their concerns, preferences, and needs with the result that 
the democratic ideal of equal governmental responsiveness to all is potentially 
compromised. …Differences in citizen activity reflect what is essentially the free exercise of 
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taste, a desire to spend one’s leisure in pursuits other than politics-for example, at the opera, 
before a television screen, under a beach umbrella, or in church-then…”  
 We argue that politically-interested individuals are willing to develop voracious music 
preferences to exhibit the possession of specific skills and resources such as personal self-
efficacy, fast life tempo and knowledge (Sullivan and Katz-Gerro, 2007). These 
characteristics are in fact crucial to improve the positive reception of their political 
convictions and to enhance their ability to convince others through the positive branding of 
their images (Verba et al., 1997). Studies on cultural voraciousness suggest that 
voraciousness not only indicates an individual’s insatiable appetite for multiple leisure 
activities (Campbell, 1967; Swidler, 1986) but it is also the expression of a polychronic, multi-
tasking lifestyle that it is typical of individuals who are able to take the lead, who are very 
busy but can still maximixe their time to achieve personal and professional objectives 
(Sullivan and Katz-Gerro, 2007). Voraciousness is therefore a way for politically-interested 
individuals to mark their distinctiveness: it is a form of status marker and cultural boundary 
that relies on time-pressuredness and active lifestyles as a new form of distinction (Sullivan 
and Katz-Gerro, 2007) that enables to seduce audiences and raise consensus around political 
ideals.  
 
Therefore we argue:  
 
Hypothesis 1. The stronger an individual’s political interest, the higher her propensity to be a 
voracious omnivorous. 
 
We argue that the strenght of an individual’s religious belief can influence her music 
tastes as well. Bourdieu did not pay much attention to religion, but he did hold that art 
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appreciation demands playful seriousness that is unlikely among religious individuals who 
are unwilling to set aside moral criteria when evaluating works of art. This argument has 
been confirmed by Katz-Gerro, Raz and  Yaish (2007) whose study on how religiosity affects 
cultural consumption in Isreal shows a negative relationship between religiosity and cultural 
consumption explained by the fact that membership in a religious group sets limit on 
cultural participaton in Israel. These findings reflect a general tendency of people following 
the precepts of fundamentalist Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, and Hinduism to 
limit their patterns of consumption in line with a set of strongly felt religious convictions.  
By contrast, a more recent cross-country study by Katz-Gerro and Meier Jaeger (2012) 
offers a new perspective on the role of religiosity in cultural consumption. Specifically, this 
study suggests that religiosity is positively related with cultural consumption and that the 
strenght of religious beliefs does not hamper individuals’ participation in culture activities. 
In a similar vein, North and Hargreaves (2007) show that religious individuals display a 
preference for a wide range of music forms including classic music, musicals, country and 
even the most problematic music forms (e.g., rock and heavy metal). These studies highlight 
a positive relationship between religiosity and omnivorousness even after controlling for 
education, age and other socio-demographic variables. As noted by Katz-Gerro and Meier 
Jaeger (2012) religious individuals have a broad network of contacts that support the 
diversity of their consumption patterns. Individuals with a high sense of religiosity are 
generally active in different forms of social participation such as voluntary association 
membership (Katz- Gerro and Meier Jaeger; Ruiter and De Graaf, 2006) that may give them 
opportunities to enter in contact with other individuals with different music traditions and 
preferences.  
We argue that religious individuals are inclined to develop an eclectic music taste. Indeed 
the diversified network of relationships that characterizes their profile allows them to 
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nurture their spirituality by entering in contacts with both highbrow and lowbrow music 
experiences. The connection between music and spirituality has a long tradition and the 
consumption of both high and popular music forms has been related to an individual’s 
search for spirituality. Within this perspective, studies in the sociology of music support the 
existence of a positive connection between spirituality and different forms of music 
including the most popular and even controversial genres (North and Hargreaves; 2007; 
Detweiler and Taylor, 1964). On the one hand a sense of religiosity is embedded in much of 
highbrow classic music tradition including the dramatic grandeur of the symphonic masses 
of Mozart, Beethoven and Haydn. Religious values also stem from Italian opera as well: 
many libretti of roman operas have been written by Popes and a huge number of Puccini’s 
and Verdi’s operas are entrenched with religious beliefs (Rosselli, 2000). On the other hand, 
spaces for spirituality can also been found within the boundaries of popular music forms. 
Detweiler and Taylor (1964) argue that “God shines through even the most debased cultural 
pop products”. These authors connect the rise of pop music forms to the most provocative, 
exciting expression of legitimate spiritual yearning. In this respect, they depict pop culture 
as a “refreshing, alternative route to god in the 20th century” and as “something profane that 
connect to the devil but also to a strong sincere spirituality”. For example, they noted that 
even Eminem and his rap music can offer new strategies to search for god: indeed, Eminem’s 
film “8 Miles”, includes some surprisingly inspiring and spiritual undertones.  
We hypothesize that individuals with strong religious beliefs are more open to appreciate 
a variety of music forms. The development of an eclectic music taste enables them to 
increase their understanding of a diversified set of music experience which flourished in 
different cultural milieux and reflect a variety of routes to connect with god and make sense 
of life. Moroever, a taste for music, just like a taste for the spiritual, needs to be developed. 
The develoment of a taste for different music forms requires an individual’s time and efforts 
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to learn and prepare herself to access a variety of music forms, expanding her current 
knowledge about music while increasing the utility of accessing different types of music 
forms in the future (Turrini, O’Hare and Borgonovi, 2010). We argue that individuals who 
are strongly motivated by a strong sense of spirituality have a higher propensity to dedicate 
time and efforts to this process.  
 
We argue:  
 
Hypothesis 2: The higher an individual’s sense of religiosity, the higher her willignness to be an 
eclectic omnivorous. 
 
 
How taste cultivation affects the development of voracious vs. eclectic music tastes 
 
Cultural tastes are not given a priori but typically acquired through a long learning 
process and they can be modified through exposure (Gray, 1998). In this respect, cultural 
consumption tends to display addictive characteristics (Turrini, 2006) which reflect a 
virtours cycle: the exposure to one artistic experience stimulates the development of greater 
artistic knowledge that, in turn, increases the addiction toward other artistic forms. 
Although both participation in formal music classes and attendance at music concerts during 
childhood nurture an individual’s appetite for different cultural experiences, we argue that 
these forms of exposure differentially affect the development of voracious vs. eclectic taste 
patterns.  
First, we contend that the greater cultural capital that individuals who attended music 
performances in their childhood have accumulated drives the development of a voracious 
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music taste. Indeed, exhibiting an appreciation for a huge quantity of music forms may 
emphasize their membership to a high status group which in turn enables them to 
perpetuate a higher social standing by signaling their culturally active life style. Indeed, 
Weber (1968) posits that the concept of lifestyle (Lebensfiihrung) plays a decisive role in 
determining whether a person belongs to a certain status group or not. Bourdieu (1984) 
demonstrates that the lifestyles of different status groups indeed mark clear boundaries 
between groups according to differences in their cultural and material capital. We argue that 
invididuals who have accumulated music capital during their childhood through a high 
frequency of attendance at music performances have incentives to maintain their 
distinctiveness by leveraging voracious taste patterns as a status marker.  
Second, we argue that individuals’ participation in formal music classes during 
childhood fosters their appreciation of a diversified set of music forms which contributes to 
the formation of an eclectic taste. The reason is that music education and learning 
experiences broadens the pool of knowledge that is required to understand and appreciate a 
variety of music genres (Graham, 2008). In this respect, people who took music classes are 
especially likely to be eclectic omnivora because the deep understanding of a specific music 
form nurtures their curiosity toward new forms of music knowledge that leads them to cross 
the boundaries between different genres.  
 
We argue:  
 
Hypothesis 3a: The higher an individual’s frequency of attendance at music concerts during her 
childhood, the higher her propensity to be a voracious omnivorous. 
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Hypothesis 3b: Individuals who have taken formal music classes in their childhood have a higher  
propensity to be eclectic omnivora compared with individuals who have not taken formal music classes 
in their childhood.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
METHODS 
Sample 
 
This study draws on data obtained from a survey of the opera audience profile of the 
Maggio Musicale Fiorentino, one of the most famous Italian operatic institutions. This 
survey includes data from 675 respondents who were asked to fill out a questionnaire 
distributed during the intervals of 5 opera performances at Maggio Musicale Fiorentino, one 
of the most famous Italian operatic institutions. As we considered only those questionnaires 
that were completed fully by participants, our final sample results in 400 observations.  
Information was obtained from respondents on their music preferences, their political and 
religious convictions, their taste cultivation (e.g., music practice and performance attendance 
during childhood) and their socio demographic profiles (e.g., gender, age and education).  
 
Measures 
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Dependent variables: eclectic vs. voracious music preferences 
 
To collect information about respondents’ music preferences we provided them with a list 
of ten different music genres from sophisticated to popular ones (classical music, opera, 
soundtrack or musical, jazz, rock, folk, pop, electro or dance; world music and urban music). 
They were asked to rank them from 1 (do not like at all) to 7 (like very much). To measure 
their propensity to be voracious omnivora we counted the number of music genres they 
assigned a score from 5 (like) to 7 (like very much).  On average, participants to our survey 
indicated a preference for 3 music genres (Table 1). 
An individual appreciation for a huge number of genres does not necessarily imply an 
openness to appreciate music forms with different degrees of “popularity” vs. 
“highbrowness” (taste eclecticism). We operationalized the extent to which an individual is 
open to appreciate a diversified set of music forms by using the inverse of the herfindahl 
index. This index captures the degree to which a responden’t music taste is equally 
distributed among highbrow, middlebrow and lowbrow genres rather than concentrated on 
one of these categories. The index varies from 0 to 1 where 0 corresponds to the minimum 
level of diversification while 1 is the maximum level of diversification. The average degree 
of diversification of our respondents’ music taste is 0.59 (Table 1). 
Independent variables: strenght of political convictions, religiosity and taste cultivation 
We gathered information about the strenght of respondents’ political convictions by asking 
them to rank their interest toward politics from 1 (not interest at all) to 7 (very much). 
Similarly we asked them to express their religiosity from  1 (atheist) to 7 (deeply devout). 
Table 1 shows that on average our respondents assigned a score of 5 to the strenght of their 
political interest in politics and a score of 4 to their religiosity (on a scale from 1 to 7).  
As for taste cultivation, we collected information about whether respondents took formal 
127  
music classes during childhood and we encoded this information as a dummy variable that 
takes value of 1 if the respondent attended musical courses in her childhood and 0 
otherwise. We also requested them to indicate the frequency of attendance at music performance 
in their family or origin and we operationalized this information as a continuous variable that 
goes from 1 (never attended) to 5 (very often). As shown in table 1 respondents declared a 
modest frequency of attendance at music concerts in their family of origin while more than a 
half of them participated in formal music classes during their childhood.   
 
Control variables: 
We also gathered socio-demographic information about our survey participants including 
their gender, age, education and size of the city where they live. We encoded these 
information as follows: 
Age: a continuous variable ranging from 10 to 87. The average age of our survey participant 
is 47. 
Education level: a categorical variable with three levels: elementary school or middle school 
(diploma or equivalent), college or higher education, bachelor’s degree, master’s degree or 
doctoral degree. Our survey participants are, on average, highly educated. More than a half 
of them have a university or post university degree (Table 1).  
Sex: a categorical variable that takes value 1 if the respondent is a woman or 0 otherwise.  
Size of the city where the respondent lives: a categorical variable that was coded with four levels: 
metropolitan (1.012.180 or more inhabitants), urban (from 50.000 to 1.012.180 inhabitants) 
and small area (below 50.000 inhabitants). As shown in table 1 most of our survey 
participants come from metropolitan area (65%). 
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Political orientation: a categorical variable with four groups: extreme left (far-left politics), left, 
right and extreme right (far-right politics). A left wing political orientation is the most 
diffused among our respondents (Table 1).  
The correlation matrix is reported in Table 2. Although the independent and control 
variables reported in Table II are only weakly correlated, we developed a variance inflation 
factor (VIF) between the explanatory variables.  
Since none of the independent variables have VIF values greater than 10 (the average VIF 
value is equal to 1.42), we do not find evidence of multicollinearity (Hair et al., 1995). 
 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table I around here 
                                                          ----------------------------------- 
 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table II around here 
                                                         ----------------------------------- 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table III presents the regression results. Model 1 examines the effect of the control 
variable on taste voraciousness while model 3 is an examination of the impact of the control 
variables on taste eclecticism. In Model 2 and in Model 4 (Table III) we added the strenght of 
an individual political and religious convictions, her frequency of attendance at music 
performances in her childhood and her participation to formal music classes as independent 
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variables and we explore their effect on the development of a voracious music taste (Model 
2) and on the formation of an eclectic taste (Model 4). As our models contains count 
variables, we estimated them with a robust poisson regression.  
 
 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table III around here 
                                                         ----------------------------------- 
 
 
In Model 1 none of the control variables has a significant impact on taste voraciousness 
apart from age. Older survey participants are less propense to be voracious omnivora 
compared with younger ones (β = -0.008, p < .001). Model 2 shows that the strenght of an 
individual political convictions positively affects taste voraciousness (β = 0.047, p < .05). This 
supports the argument that a strong political interest contributes to the formation of a 
voracious music taste, confirming what we predicted in our hypothesis 1. While 
participation in formal music classes during one’s childhood does not have any role in the 
development of a voracious taste, the frequency of music performance attendance in her 
family of origin positively affects the formation of a voracious taste pattern (β = 0.108, p < 
.001), providing support to our hypothesis 3a.  
In model 3 we reported the effect of the control variables on the formation of eclectic 
music tastes. Taste eclecticism is higher for young and highly educated individuals. Age is 
negatively and significantly related to taste eclecticism (β = -0.002, p < .001). At the same 
time, people with a higher level of education (university degree) exhibit a stronger taste 
eclecticism compared with people with a lower educational level (β = 0.050, p < .01).  
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In Model 4 we added the strenght of an individual political and religious convictions, the 
frequency of attendance at music performance in her family of origin and her participation 
in formal music classes as independent variables in order to test hypotheses 2 and 3b. Both 
models 3 and 4 have been estimated with a robust linear regression. In model 4 the higher 
the strenght of an individual’s religious convictions, the higher the eclecticism of her music 
taste (β = 0.007, p < .01). This supports our hypothesis that religious individuals have a 
higher propensity to be eclectic omnivorous. Finally, participation in formal music classes 
during one’s childhood negatively affects the formation of an eclectic music taste (β = -0.027; 
p < 0.05) while music performance attendance in the family of origin does not influence taste 
eclecticism. Thus, 3b is  not confirmed. 
 
CONCLUSION: 
 
Our objective in this article was to understand how religiosity, political convictions and 
taste cultivation influence the formation of voracious vs. eclectic music tastes. We explore 
this relationship within the context of the Italian opera scene, exploring whether and how an 
opera audience penchant for voracious vs. eclectic music preferences is shaped  by specific 
lifestyle traits such as the strenght of their religious and political beliefs as well as their 
exposure to music in their childhood.  
First, we found that the strenght of an individual political passion positively affects the 
development of voracious music tastes: politically interested individuals exhibit an 
appreciation for a huge number of music forms as a way of branding their image and 
conveying the external perception of self efficacy. Branding their image through 
voraciousness may in fact enhance their ability to persuade other people of the value and 
feasibility of their political ideals and make their opinions being heard and accepted by 
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public officials (Scammel, 2007). In opposition to what one would expect, the strength of an 
individual’s political convictions does no affect taste eclecticism. This is mostly related to the 
fact that the relationship between political beliefs and taste eclecticism may be influenced by 
other factors that we have not analysed in this study such as the characteristics of the local 
contexts that surrond a politically active individual. As a matter of fact, a local context 
characterized by political aggressiveness and historical divisions among opposite political 
parties may create barriers among social groups which obstructs the development of 
inclusive taste patterns and make individuals become culturally intolerant. Under these 
conditions, a symbolic exclusiveness in music taste would be used purposely to raise social 
and symbolic boundaries between social groups.  
Second our results also show that religiosity seems to foster an individual’s openness to 
cultural diversity.  Religious individuals are more likely to make effort and spend time to 
broaden their music taste because an increased understanding of different music genres 
allows them to expand the repertoire of strategies to nurture their spirituality. This stems 
from the fact that highbrow and lowbrow music forms offer religious individuals different 
ways to search for god and make sense of life. Religiosity is therefore connected to an 
individual’s  tolerance and openness to appreciate music forms that are rooted in distinct 
tradition and cultural milieux.  
Finally, we found that attendance at music performance during one’s childhood 
positively contributes to the development of voracious omnivorousness while music practice 
does not play any role in developing voracious taste patterns. The development of a familiar 
music habit may therefore foster an individual’s appreciation for many music genres. 
Surprisingly, our findings show that music practice hampers rather than facilitates the 
development of taste eclecticism.  
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This study has implications for the marketing management of opera houses. First, 
understanding the profile of voracious vs. eclectic consumers enables opera houses to 
improve their loyalty strategies. As individuals’ characteristics determine their loyalty to 
performing arts organizations, shedding light on the distinctive traits of voracious and 
eclectic audiences may enable opera managers to create ad hoc loyalty-building strategies 
while promoting them differently among different audiences. Shedding light on the taste 
eclecticism and voraciousness of individuals with different dispositions toward religion and 
politics may encourage opera houses to differentially target these audience segments. By 
leveraging the quantity and the variety of performances offered through subscription 
packages, opera houses have the opportunities to adapt their offering to the preferences of 
religious and politically interested cultural consumers.  
A further implication of our findings is that by developing cultural policies aimed at 
attracting families and children access opera houses, as other performing arts organizations, 
may contribute to the formation of voracious individuals, insatiably addicted to a lot of 
music experience. By contrast, by providing children with learning experiences and music 
classes they would probably obstruct rather than facilitate the formation of eclectic tastes. 
This shows the difficulties of Italian music institutions to enhance young people’s 
willingness to cross music boundaries and to encourage their willingness to invest time and 
efforts to improve their understanding of unfamiliar music styles. Broadening their 
audiences’ tastes would  require opera houses as well as other music institutions to make 
more efforts to foster young people’s awareness and appreciation for various genres by 
encouraging their deep understanding of the cultural settings in which different music styles 
and forms have flourished and diffused. This would contribute to build bridges between 
highbrow and popular music experiences which in turn may open new opportunities for 
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classic music institutions to leverage cultural diversity as a driver for the attraction of new 
audience segments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table I. Descriptive Statistics  
 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Dependent Variables:     
Voraciousness (Avg. # of music genres an individual 
likes) 
3.00  1.90 0 10 
Eclecticism (Avg. taste diversification) 0.59 0.72 0.37 0.66 
Independent Variables:     
Religiosity (On a scale from 1 to 7) 3.77 2.29 1 7 
Strenght of political interests (On a scale from 1 to 7) 4.85 1.58 1 7 
Attendance at music performances during childhood 
(On a scale from 1 to 5 “Sometimes”). 
2.84 1.23 1 5 
Participation in formal music classes 0.50 0.51 0 1 
Control Variables:     
Age 47 18 10 87 
Political Orientation      
 Extreme Left – Far Left 0.06 0.24 0 1 
 Left 0.57 0.49 0 1 
 Centre 0.18 0.38 0 1 
 Right 0.11 0.30 0 1 
 Extreme Right 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Sex      
 Female 0.51 0.50 0 1 
 Male 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Education      
 Middle School or lower 0.08 0.28 0 1 
 High School 0.29 0.45 0 1 
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 University 0.44 0.49 0 1 
 Post University 0.18 0.38 0 1 
City Size     
 Metropolitan 0.65 0.47 0 1 
 Urban 0.14 0.34 0 1 
 Small area 0.20 0.40 0 1 
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Table II. Correlation Matrix 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 Voraciousness 1                 
2 Eclecticism 0.377† 1                
3 Music_classes 0.100† 0.004 1               
4 Attendance 0.221† 0.051 0.228† 1              
5 Religiosity 0.0490 0.118† 0.006 0.071 1             
6 Pol. interest -
0.00929 
-0.066 -0.035 0.004 -0.086 1            
7 University -0.0442 0.006 -0.015 -0.015 -0.118† 0.128† 1           
8 High School -0.0374 -0.007 -0.088 0.007 0.060 -0.0453 -0.580† 1          
9 Post Univ -
0.00971 
-0.065 0.056 0.005 0.027 0.092 -0.406† -0.296† 1         
10  Metropolitan 0.002 0.021 0.018 0.089 -0.012 0.040 0.014 -0.047 0.009 1        
11 Medium-small 0.056 -0.032 0.083 -0.051 0.0118 -0.035 0.025 -0.022 0.015 -0.545† 1       
12  Age -0.268† -
0.371† 
-0.265† -0.084 0.028 0.296† 0.173† -0.072 0.081 0.073 -0.104† 1      
13  Female -0.037 0.0383 0.017 0.173† 0.1315
† 
-0.109† 0.026 -0.030 0.092† 0.018 -0.045 0.022 1     
14  Left -0.0526 -
0.0337 
0.0111 -0.022 -0.271† 0.150† 0.008 0.035 0.033 0.028 -0.062 0.016 0.012 1    
15 Extreme left 0.0903† 0.0219 0.012 0.020 -0.067 0.117† 0.087† -0.109† 0.032 0.028 0.008 -0.025 -0.066 -0.125 1   
16 Centre -0.029 0.045 -0.014 0.024 0.239† -0.126† 0.060 -0.094 -0.025 0.075 -0.046 0.128† 0.132† -0.545† -0.125† 1  
17 Right 0.015 0.004 -0.108 -0.032 0.181† -0.066 -0.063 0.019 0.007 -0.133† 0.000 0.001 -0.055 -0.142† -0.090† -0.142† 1 
Significance: 
†p < .10. 
1  
 
Table III. Model Estimation.  
The effect of religiosity, political convictions and taste cultivation  
on taste voraciousness and eclecticism  
 
 
Dependent Variables 
      Voraciousness                     Eclecticism 
 
Eclecticism  
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Independent Variables 
 
    
Religiosity 
-    0.009 
(0.71) 
-     0.007** 
(3.04) 
 Political Engagement  
- 0.047* 
(2.35) 
-      0.004 
(1.14) 
 Performance attendance in the family of 
origin 
- 0.108*** 
(4.51) 
-      0.000 
(0.06) 
Participation in formal music classes 
- -0.022 
(-0.35) 
- -0.027* 
(-2.14) 
Control Variables      
High School (a) 
   -0.086 
(-0.85) 
   0.123 
(1.24) 
     0.033† 
(1.80) 
    0.025 
(1.40) 
University    (a) 
-0.028 
(-0.29) 
0.063 
(0.67) 
   0.050** 
(2.84) 
    0.050** 
(2.85) 
Post University  (a) 
-0.017 
(-0.15) 
 
-0.062 
(-0.54) 
   0.030 
(1.37) 
0.027 
(1.24) 
Metropolitan area (b) 
   0.069 
(0.90) 
   0.045 
(0.60) 
   0.005 
(0.38) 
   0.007 
(0.55) 
Medium-small area (b)  
    0.086 
(0.74) 
   0.102 
(0.90) 
   -0.021 
(-0.98) 
-0.019 
(-0.91) 
Age 
  -
0.008*** 
(-5.24) 
-0.009*** 
(-5.37) 
   -
0.002*** 
(-9.06) 
  -
0.003*** 
(-9.59) Woman (c) 
   0.001 
(0.02) 
   -0.041 
(-0.68) 
   0.002 
(0.22) 
 
    0.000 
(0.03) 
Left political party (d) 
   -0.001 
(0.01) 
   -0.014 
(-0.14) 
   0.029 
(1.34) 
    0.029 
(1.32) 
Extreme Left political party (d) 
    0.191 
(1.17) 
   0.135 
(0.85) 
    0.036 
(1.16) 
   0.032 
(1.03) 
Centre (d) 
0.014 
(0.12) 
0.005 
(0.04) 
   0.058* 
(2.36) 
0.048† 
(1.93) 
Right (d) 
0.062 
(0.48) 
0.052 
(0.41) 
   0.039 
(1.54) 
0.024 
(0.92) 
 
Constant 
    1.44*** 
(9.94) 
  0.966*** 
(5.29) 
  - 
0.468*** 
(- 17.36) 
  -
0.483*** 
(-14.10) No. of observations       400      400 
 
      400       00 
Degrees of Freedom         11        15         11         15 
 𝑾𝒂𝒍𝒅𝓧𝟐    44.99***    
88.01*** 
 
 
86.31*** 
- 
106.63*** 
- Significance: 
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; †p < .10; t-statistic in parenthesis 
(a)Reference category: Middle School or Lower; (b) Reference category: small area; (c) Reference category: man;  
(d) Reference categories: Right  
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